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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States remains one of the few nations that has not ratified 
Additional Protocol I (“AP I”) to the Geneva Conventions.1 That 
 
 *   © 2014 Jeremy Rabkin.  Professor of Law, George Mason University.  For helpful 
comments on earlier drafts, the author thanks Daniel Baugh, Joseph Kochanek, Nicholas 
Rostow, Abram Shulsky.  Thanks also to Lauren Mee-Salter (JD 2014, GMU) for energetic 
and unfailingly reliable research assistance. 
 1.  The 174 current parties include Russia, China, North Korea and all NATO 
members except the United States.  The United Kingdom ratified only in 1998—after 
more than two decades of hesitation or deliberation—and submitted additional reservations to 
its ratification in 2002.  For a list of current states adhering to AP I (with accompanying 
reservations), see DIETRICH SCHINDLER & JIRI TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, A 
COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 785–818 (Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2014) [hereinafter THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT]. 
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convention, the most comprehensive treaty on the law of armed conflict, 
has been open for signature since 1977.2 
Prominent legal commentators insist that most of the specific prohibitions 
in AP I have by now become part of “customary international law,” 
binding as such on the United States and all nations.3 The United States 
does not fully subscribe to this view.4  The Statute of the International 
Criminal Court5, completed in 1998, incorporates almost all the provisions 
of AP I, but the United States has never ratified the ICC Statute. In fact, 
it is one of the only western countries that has not done so.6  During the 
administration of George W. Bush, disputes about the law of armed conflict 
fueled debates about American detention policies at Guantanamo Bay as 
well as American military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.7  Energetic 
resort to drone strikes against suspected terrorists sparked new debates 
about American compliance with international law under the Obama 
administration.8 
Largely forgotten, amidst these recent disputes, is that the United States 
dissented from prevailing European doctrines on just war long before the 
world wars of the Twentieth Century. Instead, the United States generally 
followed opposing views maintained by British authorities. Britain and 
America had both been outliers in international debates on the law of 
war throughout the Nineteenth Century and down to the First World 
War.9 
 
 2.  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 711–61 
[hereinafter Protocol I].  
 3.  1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 340–51 (2005) [hereinafter CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW]. 
 4.  John B. Bellinger III & William J. Haynes II, A US Government Response to 
the International Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian 
Law, 89 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 443, 444 (2007). 
 5.  See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 1309–74. 
 6.  The 122 current parties include all NATO members other than the United 
States, all members of the European Union, as well as 34 African states and 27 states in 
Latin America and the Carribean region.  For a current list, with accompanying reservations, 
see THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 1382–95.  
 7.  For a highly polemical compilation of such claims, see MICHAEL HAAS, 
GEORGE BUSH, WAR CRIMINAL? (2008), which devotes by far most attention to “Crimes 
Committed in Treatment of Prisoners” —113 pages out of 202 on “Identification of War 
Crimes.” For a survey of Bush administration responses to such charges, see generally 
JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006). 
 8.  For survey of the debate, see Ryan Vogel, Drone Warfare and the Law of 
Armed Conflict, 39 DENV. J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y (2011). 
 9.  See infra §§ IV–V.  
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What they disputed was not a technicality or a peripheral policy issue, 
but instead what AP I calls the “Basic Rule” of humanitarian law; that 
military “operations” must aim at legitimate “military objectives” and not at 
civilians or “civilian objects.”10 Commentators call it the “principle of 
distinction” and often depict it as the “core principle” of the law of armed 
conflict.11  The most widely consulted commentary on AP I—sponsored 
by the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”), which convened 
the 1974-77 drafting conferences for AP I—claims that this principle 
rests on centuries of western military practice.12 The principle may have 
been frequently disregarded amidst the world wars of the Twentieth 
Century, but it remains (in this view) the time-honored principle.13 
The actual historical record, however, shows that this principle was 
openly disputed by commentators in England and America, both before 
and during the world wars.14 The dissenting commentators in the 
English-speaking countries were not swaggering retired generals, but the 
leading Anglo-American publicists of international law. They did not 
reject the notion of humanitarian constraints in the conduct of war, but 
they did argue, quite explicitly and cogently, that humanitarian constraint 
did not require the immunity of civilian property from military attack. 
In the Nineteenth Century, the dispute focused on the seizure of private 
property at sea, which British and American commentators, defended 
but Europeans, especially Germans, denounced. The severity of the 
Anglo-American view, even in land warfare, is evident in the harsh 
tactics adopted by Union forces in the American Civil War. Anglo-
American severity was later displayed in still harsher measures pursued 
in the world wars, including a food blockade by sea and bombing of 
cities from the air. But the contrary view, most fully embraced by Germany, 
 
 10.  Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 48. 
 11.  See, e.g., GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 250–57, 269–71 (2010) (“distinction” as one of four “core 
principles” of LOAC); MARCO SASSOLI & ANTOINE BOUVIER, HOW DOES LAW PROTECT 
IN WAR 67 (ICRC, 1999) (distinction between “civilians and combatants” listed as first 
of the “basic principles”  of “International Humanitarian Law”); GEOFFREY S. CORN ET 
AL., THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH 115–24 (2012) 
(identifying “military necessity” and “humanity” as “cardinal princip les,” then 
characterizing “distinction” and “proportionality” as “implementation principles”).  
 12.  INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS 
OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, 585–87 (Yves Sandoz, 
Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann, eds., 1987) [hereinafter COMMENTARY]. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  See infra §§ IV and V. 
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led to far more brutal measures in land warfare.  German war measures 
were denounced as “savage” and “barbarous” by Anglo-American 
commentators, who viewed such brutalities as morally quite different 
from Allied war tactics.15 
These episodes in the history of international humanitarian law deserve to 
be recalled. They may challenge contemporary dogmas. They remind us 
that, just below the surface, claims for “humanitarian” principle remain 
disputable and uncertain, even in today’s world. What “everyone agrees” 
may not be right. It may not even be what everyone—even everyone of 
relevant experience and moral seriousness—actually agrees upon. 
The exposition here proceeds in six parts. Part II describes the 
contemporary setting of the legal issue, in the “Basic Rule” of Additional 
Protocol I, highlighting that this rule has no counterpart in earlier 
conventions on the law of war. Part III describes the historic roots of this 
doctrine, in theories originally advanced in Napoleonic France, claiming 
the authority of Rousseau, then developed and “codified” by German 
commentators in the mid-Nineteenth Century. Part IV describes the 
arguments advanced in opposition to this doctrine in the late Nineteenth 
and early Twentieth Centuries by legal commentators in Britain. Part V 
describes the evolution of American views in the Nineteenth and early 
Twentieth Century, starting from a position not all that far from the British 
view, in principle, then driven to embrace very far-reaching applications 
of the British view in the stress of all-out war. Part VI describes the 
evolution of German views, showing connections between the seemingly 
idealistic formulas of German legal commentators in the Nineteenth Century 
and the brutalities of German war tactics in subsequent practice. Part VII 
shows that the historic Anglo-American view was invoked to defend 
British and American tactics in the world wars and argues that this traditional 
view remains quite relevant to contemporary debates over humanitarian 
limits on military action. 
II.  THE NOVELTY OF THE BASIC RULE 
Contemporary treatises on the law of armed conflict give prominent 
place to what is called the “principle of distinction”—the doctrine that 
lawful armed attacks may only aim at legitimate military targets.16 AP I 
gives special status to this “principle” or “rule” by naming it the “Basic 
Rule.”17 
 
 15.  See infra § V. 
 16.  See examples cited, supra note 11. 
 17.  Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 48. 
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AP I is the most comprehensive and detailed international convention 
on the law of armed conflict that has ever been adopted. Regulations 
limiting military tactics in land warfare had been negotiated at the Hague 
Peace Conference in 1899,18 then slightly revised at the Second Hague 
Peace Conference in 1907.19 There was much dispute about how well 
these conventions respected in the ensuing world wars.20 Steering clear 
of such controversies, the Geneva conference of 1949 launched four new 
conventions, but all focused on rather specialized (and somewhat 
peripheral) humanitarian concerns: protections for wounded soldiers,21 
protection for shipwrecked sailors,22 protection for prisoners of war,23 
and protection for civilians in wartime occupation zones.24 Though 
styled as a “protocol” or addendum to these 1949 conventions , AP I 
actually elaborates on earlier Hague conventions as well as these more 
specialized Geneva rules.25 
The resulting convention is far longer than any previous convention 
on the law of war,26 far more precise on many issues, and far more 
 
 18.  See Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
July 29, 1899 [hereinafter Hague Convention II], reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED 
CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 55–90.   
 19.  Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
and its Annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, October 
18, 1907, 187 CTS 227, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 55–
82 [hereinafter Hague Convention IV].  
 20.  GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE: THE MODERN HISTORY OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS 224–28 (Columbia Univ. Press, 1980). 
 21.  Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, reprinted in THE 
LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 459–80. 
 22.  Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, 
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 
reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 485–503. 
 23.  Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 
507–65. 
 24.  Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, 
supra note 1, at 575–627. 
 25.  AP I devotes considerable attention (arts. 48–71) to the conduct of military 
operations, as by seeking to impose limits on permissible targets for “attack.” Rules on 
this subject appear in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations but not at all in the 1949 
Geneva conventions.  
 26.  See ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFF, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 
59 (Oxford Press, 3rd ed., 2000). In this edition, the Hague Regulations on land warfare 
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demanding in its terms.27 While previous drafting conferences produced 
complete conventions in a matter of weeks or months, AP I required an 
additional three years of high-level meetings.28 These were meetings 
attended by a far larger number and range of countries than at previous 
conferences on the law of armed conflict.29 With the participation of new 
nations that emerged from decolonization in Africa and Asia in the 
1960s, there were nearly twice as many states represented at the Geneva 
conferences in the 1970s30 as in the 1949 Geneva conference.31 That total 
was nearly a five-fold increase from the gathering at the Hague in 1899, 
which drew only 26 states.32 
With all this diplomatic activity, the new convention spoke with 
confidence.  Article 48 articulates what it calls the “Basic Rule” in these 
sweeping terms: 
In order to assure respect for and protection of the civilian population and 
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between 
the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military 
objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military 
objectives.33 
Subsequent provisions spell out the implications.  Lawful “attacks” can 
only be “directed at a specific military objective.”34  Even “attacks” directed 
at otherwise lawful military targets are prohibited, however,  when they 
“may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated.”35  Legitimate “military objectives” include “those objects which 
by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution 
to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or 
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite 
military advantage.”36 
 
are reproduced in 9 pages, the 1949 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War—the longest of 
the 1949 conventions—in 54 pages, while Additional Protocol I takes up 71 pages. 
 27.  The Hague Regulations cover the conduct of military operations in 6 articles 
(arts. 22–28), occupying little more than one full page in Roberts and Guelff, Documents.  
The corresponding provisions in AP I require 19 articles (arts. 48–67), occupying 14 
pages in this collection.   
 28.  Id. at 419. 
 29.  Id.  
 30.  Id.  (124 states were represented in the 1970s).  
 31.  Id. at 195 (64 states were represented at Geneva conference in 1949). 
 32.  Id. at 59 (26 states were represented at the Hague in 1899). 
 33.  Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 48 
 34.  Id. art. 51, ¶ 4(a). 
 35.  Id. art. 51, ¶ 5(b). 
 36.  Id. art. 52, ¶ 2 (emphasis added). 
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The Red Cross Commentary highlights the reasoning behind these 
restrictions.37  The “basic principle” of “distinction” between  military 
objectives and civilian life and property is, it insists, “the foundation on 
which the codification of the laws and customs of war rests.”38 That 
seems to be the assumption behind AP I. The Preamble states that the 
convention is motivated by belief in the need to “reaffirm and develop” 
earlier treaty provisions and to “supplement” and “reinforce their 
application.”39 The very term “Protocol” implies that the new material 
merely extends an existing foundation in prior treaties.40 
An alert reader might notice that the Commentary, which is normally 
prolific with citations, actually offers little precedential support for its 
claim about the “Basic Rule.”  The earliest source it cites is the 1868 St. 
Petersburg Declaration, which stipulated, “[T]he only legitimate objective 
which States endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military 
forces of the enemy.”41  The Commentary itself acknowledges, however, 
that this admonition was “concerned with preventing superfluous injury 
or unnecessary suffering to combatants” (emphasis added).42 The Declaration 
sought to prohibit use of explosive bullets against soldiers in battle and 
“was not aimed at specifically protecting the civilian population.”43 In 
fact, nothing so sweeping as the “Basic Rule” had appeared in any previous 
treaty.44 
The 1907 Hague Convention on Land Warfare, for example, includes 
no general statement comparable to the “Basic Rule.”  Instead, the 
accompanying regulations set out specific rules governing particular 
situations.45 The regulations do enjoin signatories not to “destroy or 
 
 37.  COMMENTARY, supra note 12, at 598. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Protocol I, supra note 1, Preamble. 
 40.  JOHN P. GRANT & J. CRAIG BAKER, ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 487 (Oxford, 3rd ed., 2009) (“protocol . . . usually denotes a treaty amending, or 
supplemental to, another treaty ….”). 
 41.  Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles 
Under 400 Grammes Weight, Signed at St. Petersburg, Nov. 29, 1868, reprinted in THE 
LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 91–93. 
 42.  COMMENTARY, supra note 12, at 598. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  See Horace B. Robertson, The Principle of the Military Objective in the Law of 
Armed Conflict, 72 INT’L L. STUD. SER. US NAVAL WAR Col. 197, 197 (1998). 
 45.  Hague Convention IV, supra note 19.  Substantive prohibitions appear in the 
annex to the Convention, styled “Regulations.”  
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seize the enemy’s property,”46 but this prohibition might be read as a 
special admonition to occupying armies (which could choose whether to 
“seize” or to “destroy” property) rather than an all-encompassing rule, 
applying even to  targets still in enemy hands.47 
Subsequent provisions in the Hague Regulations confirm this view 
The Regulations prohibit “bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, 
villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended,”48 implying that 
localities or structures which are defended (and therefore cannot simply 
be seized by troops on the ground) may be lawfully bombarded. The 
immediately following provision admonishes the commander of an 
attacking force to “warn the authorities” on the defending side “before 
commencing a bombardment.”49 That phrasing seems to indicate  that, if 
they do not take the opportunity to flee, civilians harboring in civilian 
buildings may be lawfully placed at risk. The next provision stipulates 
that in “sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to 
spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science or 
charitable purposes,” along with “historic monuments, hospitals and places 
where the sick and wounded are collected.”50 The implication is that, 
when it comes to ordinary civilian structures, commanders are not under 
the same obligation to take precautionary measures against doing harm. 
Even for buildings and monuments devoted to special purposes, moreover, 
 
 46.  Id. art. 23(g). Even this prohibition contains an exception: “unless such 
destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.” Id.  
 47.  At the Hague Conference in 1899, the drafting committee “proposed to omit 
this clause as it seemed to it useless in view of the provisions further on prescribing 
respect for private property.”  Art. 46 stipulates that “private property can not be confiscated” 
and Art. 47 declares “pillage” to be “formally forbidden.”  These later provisions occur 
in a section devoted to rules for “established” authority in occupied territory which “can 
be exercised” routinely (Sec. III, starting at Art. 42).  The clause prohibiting armies to 
“destroy or seize the enemy’s property” (23g) was restored at the prompting of a Belgian 
delegate, who argued that it might apply to some situations involving ongoing “hostilities,” 
the subject of the section where Art. 23 appears.  He seems to have been thinking of situations 
where an enemy army was in control of a particular town but its general occupation 
authority not fully “established” or fully “exercised” (as Art. 42 requires).  The German 
delegate insisted that in such settings, the prohibition in Art. 23g “certainly ought not to 
be taken to prohibit the destruction of any buildings whatever and by no means when 
military operations rendered it necessary.”  According to the official report on this session, 
“This remark met with no objection . . . .” 1 JAMES BROWN SCOTT, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, CONFERENCE OF 1899, at 424 (Oxford 1921) (Report on 
Second Commission, Meeting of July 5). 
 48.  Id. art. 25. 
 49.  Id. art. 36 
 50.  Id. art. 27. 
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the Hague Regulations make the special-care obligations conditional on 
these sites “not being used at the time for military purposes.”51 
The somewhat equivocal character of these prohibitions was underlined 
by the statement of purpose in the preamble that the regulations aimed to 
“diminish the evils of war, as far as military requirements permit” and to 
“serve as a general rule of conduct” (emphasis added).52 The Preamble then 
falls back on this notably vague disclaimer: “in cases not included in the 
Regulations, the inhabitants [of conflict zones] and the belligerents 
remain under the protection of . . . the principles of the law of nations, as 
they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from 
the laws of humanity and the dictates of public conscience.”53 Whatever 
these cloudy formulations were intended to illuminate, they do not read 
as first drafts of AP-I’s “Basic Rule.” 
The same Hague conference that approved these rules on land warfare 
in 1907 also approved a convention on “Bombardment by Naval Forces 
in Time of War.”54  Among other things, that Convention forbids 
“bombardment of undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings or 
buildings,”55 but offers exceptions. One exception states that after warnings 
to the inhabitants, “a naval force may destroy with artillery” not only 
“military or naval establishments, depots of arms or war materiel,” but 
also “workshops or plant which could be utilized for the needs of the 
hostile fleet or army.”56  Further, the Convention expressly authorizes 
“bombardment of undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings or 
buildings”—again after warning—in order to force “local authorities” to 
“comply with requisitions for provisions or supplies.”57 Thus, for the 
sake of coercing civil authorities rather than disarming an opposing 
 
 51.  Id. art. 27. This proviso is categorical—immunity for such special settings is 
entirely forfeited when used for military purposes.  By contrast, AP I admonishes that 
states must not “direct the movement of the civilian population . . . to shield military 
objectives from attacks,” but then immediately provides that “violation  of these 
prohibitions shall not release the Parties to the conflict from their legal obligations with 
respect to the civilian population and civilians. . .” Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 50, ¶¶ 7, 
8. 
 52.  Hague Convention IV, supra note 19 at Preamble. 
 53.  Id.  
 54.  Hague Convention (IX) Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time 
of War, Oct. 18, 1907, 205 C.T.S. 345, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, 
supra note 1, at 1079–83. 
 55.  Id. art. 1. 
 56.  Id. art. 2. 
 57.  Id. art. 3. 
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military force, the Convention authorizes intentional destruction of civilian 
property, though not deliberate killing of civilians. 
In the mid-1950s, a more specialized Hague Conference launched a 
“Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict.”58 It committed signatories to respect a zone of “special 
protection” for “cultural property,” defined to include “monuments of 
architecture, art or history” and “works of art, manuscripts, books and 
other objects of artistic, historical and archeological interest.”59 However, 
the Convention made this “special protection” conditional on the “cultural 
property” being “situated at an adequate distance from any large industrial 
centre.”60 This limitation seems premised on the assumption that “any 
large industrial centre” might be, in itself, a reasonable target for attack 
in wartime, along with categories it itemizes separately as targets constituting 
an “important military objective.”61 The entire Hague Convention on 
Cultural Property would seem superfluous if signatories were already 
bound to limit their attacks solely to “military objectives.” 
There is, then, no intimation of anything so sweeping as AP I’s “Basic 
Rule” in earlier conventions.  Where did the “Basic Rule” come from, 
then? The Red Cross Commentary suggests that the rule was so taken for 
granted in earlier times that it did not need to be stated as such.62  The 
Commentary does explain how Atlanta became a “combat zone” in the 
American Civil War nor how Paris came to suffer massive bombardment 
during the Franco-Prussian War.63  Quite a lot gets left out in the way the 
Red Cross tells the history of war. 
 
 58.  Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED 
CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 999–1012. 
 59.  Id. arts. 1, 8. 
 60.  Id. art. 8, ¶ 1a. 
 61.  Id. “There may be placed under special protection . . . moveable cultural 
property . . . monuments and other immovable cultural property of very great importance, 
provided they: (a) are situated at an adequate distance from any large industrial centre or 
from any important military objective constituting a vulnerable point, such as, for 
example, an aerodrome, broadcasting station, establishment engaged upon work of 
national defence, a port or railway station of relative importance or a main line of 
communication.” Id.  
 62.  COMMENTARY, supra note 12, at 598 (“Up to the First World War, there was 
little need for [treaty provisions to clarify] the practical implementation of this customary 
rule [exempting civilians and civilian objects] as the population barely suffered from the 
use of weapons unless it was actually in the combat zone itself.”). 
 63.  On bombardment of Paris, see ROBERT TOMBS, The Wars Against Paris, in ON 
THE ROAD TO TOTAL WAR 541 (Stig Forster & Jorg Nagler, eds., Cambrdige Univ. Press, 
1997).  On burning of Atlanta, see JAMES MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM 809 
(Oxford Press, 1988). 
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The Commentary does offer another explanation, however:  “The custom 
of war acquired a more humanitarian character . . . as a result of the 
influence of thinkers and jurists.”64 Only one actual “thinker” or “jurist” 
is mentioned in this strangely truncated account: the Swiss-born legal 
scholar, Johann Caspar Bluntschli,65 who ended up as professor of law at 
Heidelberg in the era of Bismarck.66 As the Red Cross summarizes the 
history of humanitarian law, the views of Professor Bluntschli illustrate 
the main line of historical development, which reached its ultimate— 
perhaps logically irresistible, perhaps even predestined—culmination in 
the Basic Rule of Additional Protocol I. 
This citation does offer a window into actual debates of the late 
Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries. Bluntschli was indeed an 
active participant in those debates.67 All prominent British commentators 
on international law, before the First World War, cited and rejected 
Bluntschli’s reasoning, all in very emphatic terms.68 The U.S. government 
at times deprecated the British naval attacks on civilian commerce while 
British commentators defended the practice.69  Still, on the fundamental 
principle—how to understand the underlying legal implications of war—
all the major American treatises on international law endorsed the basic 
British view.70 
Bluntschli’s theory deserves continuing attention. It did win support 
from the majority of Continental European commentators by the early 
Twentieth Century, but that theory was firmly resisted by British and 
American commentators.71  It might seem of some relevance, moreover, 
that compared with Continental states supporting the Bluntschili doctrine, 
Britain and America played a much more decisive role in the actual 
military practice of the Twentieth Century. 
 
 64.  COMMENTARY, supra note 12, at 585. 
 65.  Id. at 586 n.3 (citing Das moderne Kriegsrecht der civilisirten Staaten [Modern 
Law of War in Civilized States] (1874), Das moderne Völkerrecht der civilisirten 
Staaten [Modern International Law in Civilized States] (1878), and Das Beuterecht im 
Krieg und das Seebeuterecht insbesondere [The Law of Prize in War and Especially Law 
of Prize at Sea] (1878)). 
 66.  For a contemporary appreciation of Bluntschli’s career, see HERBERT B. 
ADAMS, BLUNTSCHLI’S LIFE-WORK (John Murphy & Co., 1884). 
 67.  See infra § III. 
 68.  See infra § IV. 
 69.  See infra § IV.  
 70.  See infra § V. 
 71.  See infra §§ IV, V. 
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III.  ROOTS OF THE “BASIC RULE” 
Bluntschli’s treatise on international law lays down the principle in very 
clear language, “War is a relation between states, not between individuals.”72  
In ancient times, warring armies “confounded the citizens of the enemy 
state with the state itself.”73 Though the modern understanding took 
many centuries to become accepted, it was “prepared by the order of Christ, 
‘Love your enemies’” and then developed by “the science and practice of 
modern governments.”74 
Bluntschli’s account does not indicate which teachers developed this 
understanding after Jesus. He offered one contemporary exemplar, 
however—his own monarch, Kaiser Wilhelm I.75 As King of Prussia in 
1870, Wilhelm had issued a proclamation insisting he was making war 
on French soldiers, not French citizens.76 This same proclamation is 
mentioned by the ICRC Commentary, the only concrete episode of a 
European war which is mentioned before the world wars.77 Neither 
Bluntschli nor the Commentary troubles to consider whether the Prussian 
army actually adhered to this lofty aim in its conduct of the war. The 
point in these accounts is the stated principle—as proclaimed at the outset 
of the war. The Prussian ideal, as an initial statement of intentions, is left 
to speak for itself. 
Bluntschli’s treatise did offer more background, however, on the 
earlier history of this ideal. It was, by his account, originally a French 
ideal, connected with the new ideas that emerged with the Revolution in 
France.  In 1801, as Bluntschli reports, Napoleon’s Councilor of State, 
Jean-Etienne-Marie Portalis, gave a speech celebrating the inauguration 
of the new French prize court (for assessing the legality of French 
seizures of enemy ships and cargoes at sea).78  Portalis was one of the 
chief compilers of the new Code Civil, popularly known as the Napoleonic 
Code.79 Decades earlier, he had published a book on the philosophy of 
 
 72.  JOHANN CASPAR BLUNTSCHLI, DAS MODERNE VÖLKERRECHT DER CIVILISIRTEN 
STATEN ALS RECHTSBUCH DARGESTELLT 297 (Nordlingen, 1878) (hereinafter MODERNE 
VOLKERRECHT); JOHANN CASPAR BLUNTSCHLI, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL CODIFIÉ 299 
(M.C. Landy, trans., Libraire Germer 5th ed. 1895) (Fr.) [hereinafter LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
CODIFIÉ ].  
 73.  Id. at § 530. 
 74.  Id.  
 75.  Id. at 298, 299 (§ 531). 
 76.  Id.  
 77.  COMMENTARY, supra note 12, at 585–86. 
 78.  MODERNE VÖLKERRECHT, supra note 72, at 297; LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
CODIFIÉ, supra note 72 at 299. 
 79.  For the career of Jean-Etienne-Marie Portalis, see entry in ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA (11th ed.) or the earlier and more complete account (in French) in 
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Jean-Jacques Rousseau.80 In his prize court speech, Portalis set out the 
principle articulated by Rousseau in The Social Contract: that  war is a 
relation between states, not between individuals. From this premise, 
Portalis drew the conclusion that civilian commerce should not be an 
object of attack in war.81 
Rousseau offered his formulation—war is solely a relation between 
states—to show why conquest does not give the conquering army the 
right to enslave its defeated enemies.82 The Social Contract actually says 
nothing about war measures affecting civilian commerce,83 but the 
extrapolation by Portalis was well received in the midst of an ongoing 
war with Britain.84  A few years after Portalis laid down the new doctrine, 
his emperor issued a decree banning British ships from continental 
ports.85 In the preamble, Napoleon emphasized the unique barbarism of 
British naval practice; “considering that England does not admit the law 
of nations universally followed by all civilized peoples, that she reputes 
as an enemy every individual belonging to the enemy state and consequently 
makes the crews of merchant ships prisoners of war . . .”86 
 
MICHAUD, 34 BIOGRAPHIE UNIVERSELLE ANCIENNE ET MODERNE 135 (Mme Desplaces, 
1862) [hereinafter BIOGRAPHIE UNIVERSELLE]. 
 80.  BIOGRAPHIE UNIVERSELLE, supra note 79. 
 81.  For Bluntschli’s account, see MODERNE VOLKERRECHT, supra note 72, at 298.  
 82.  JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER POLITICAL 
WRITINGS 15–16 (Christopher Bertram ed., Quintin Hoare trans., Penguin Classics 2012) 
[hereinafter The Social Contract]. “War is by no means a relationship between one man 
and another but a relationship between one State and another, in which individuals are 
enemies only accidently, not as men or even as citizens, but as soldiers; not as members of the 
Fatherland, but as its defenders.  For any State may have only other States as enemies, not 
men, considering that no real relation may be fixed between things of differing nature.” 
Id.  
 83. Rousseau offers an apologetic explanation at the end of the Social Contract:  
“[E]xternal relations, including the right of nations, commerce, the right of war and 
conquest, public right, leagues, negotiations, treaties, etc” form “a new subject” which 
cannot be covered in this work. Id. 
 84. The First Lord of the Admiralty at the outset of both world wars in the next 
century, also a distinguished historian, described Napoleon’s predicament this way:  
“The British blockade wrapped the French Empire and Napoleon’s Europe in a clammy 
shroud.  No trade, no coffee, no sugar, no contact with the East, or with the Americans!  
And no means of ending the deadlock!” WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, THE AGE OF 
REVOLUTION 314 (Dodd, Mead, 1957)  
 85.  The episode is described in WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 485 (Oxford Press, 8th ed. 1924) (1884). 
 86.  Id.  
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That outlook proved to have more staying power than Napoleon’s 
empire. In 1856, at the peace conference following the Crimean War, 
European powers issued the Declaration of Paris, holding that privateering 
(wartime attacks on commercial shipping by government-licensed raiders) 
should be considered unlawful.87 Some Europeans urged a more 
comprehensive measure.  In 1859, city officials in the great trading ports 
of Hamburg and Bremen urged recognition of the principle that merchant 
ships and civilian cargo at sea should not be targets of military attack, 
regardless of their origin or ownership.88 At the outset of the 1866 war 
between Prussia and the Austrian Empire, both sides agreed that they would 
abstain from attacks on each other’s commercial shipping.89  Then, at the 
start of war with France in 1870, Prussia offered to abstain from attacks 
on French shipping if France would reciprocate.90 When France declined 
the offer and then seized a few Prussian merchant ships, Bismarck 
ordered that French officials seized on land be held hostage to force the 
release of German merchant sailors in French hands.91 
It was Britain, however, that had the largest navy.92  Naturally, it was 
Britain that received the main burden of criticism for asserting the right 
to seize enemy merchant ships as prize of war.93 In the mid-Nineteenth 
 
 87.  Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Signed at Paris, 16 April 1856, reprinted in 
THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 1055–56.  For background on the 
negotiations leading to the Declaration, see MARTIN LEMNITZER, POWER, LAW AND THE 
END OF PRIVATEERING 57–95 (Palgrave, 2014).  
 88.  Id. at 100–10 
 89.  HALL, supra note 85. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Bismarck’s retaliation is described—with disapproval— in General Theory of 
the relation of Subjects to War in JOHN WESTLAKE, THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN 
WESTLAKE ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 268–69 (L. Oppenheim ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 1914) [hereinafter COLLECTED PAPERS].  Cf. Hague Convention (XI) Relative to 
Certain Restrictions with Regard to the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War, 
Oct. 18, 1907, art. 6 (“Regulations Regarding the Crews of Enemy Merchant Ships 
Captured by a belligerent:  The captain, officers and members of the crew, when 
nationals of the enemy State, are not made prisoners of war, on condition that they make 
a formal promise in writing, not to undertake, while hostilities last, any service 
connected with the operations of the war.”).  This convention seemed, at the time, to be 
altering earlier practice. See DOCUMENTS ON THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 26.  Allied 
practice in the world wars reverted to holding enemy merchant crews as prisoners of 
war, which has “diminished the significance of the Convention in that respect.” Id. 
Current U.S. policy is that “officers and crews of captured enemy merchant ships . . . 
may be made prisoners of war.”  COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK § 8.2.2.1, reprinted in 64 
INT’L L. STUD. 467–77 (Horace Robertson, ed., 1991). 
 92.  See LAWRENCE SONDHAUS, NAVIES IN MODERN WORLD HISTORY 10, 34 
(Reaktion, 2004) (In 1815, Britain’s Royal Navy was “the largest navy the world had yet 
known” and from then until the start of the First World War, “no navy dared challenge 
the British to battle at sea”). 
 93.  LEMNITZER, supra note 87.  
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Century, the Prussian jurist August Wilhelm Heffter, a judge in Berlin 
and member of the upper house in the Prussian Landtag, delivered a sharp 
attack on the British practice in his treatise on international law.94  Naval 
war remained “more cruel and more murderous than land warfare” because 
it had never acquired “precise rules, due to the disequilibrium of naval 
powers” (i.e., British predominance at sea), so it had “retained down to 
our own times more or less the character of sheer plundering.”95 
The British government remained unmoved. In 1874, a conference 
was convened in Brussels to formulate basic principles of restraint in war.96 
Britain refused to participate unless naval war was excluded from the 
discussion.97 British participants took the same position when scholars 
assembled at Oxford in 1880 to propose more detailed rules of limitation.98 
Even then, the British government rejected proposals to embody the 
recommendations of these conferences into formal, binding treaties, doubting 
that even standards of land warfare could be formulated in precise rules.99 
 In an article published in one of the leading European journals on 
international law of that era, Bluntschli wrote about the dispute as if it 
were the central issue in the progress of civilization: 
Unfortunately, the great progress in the law of war has only been achieved for 
law on land, England insisting on this condition to participate [in negotiations 
on humanitarian standards].  Thus, while on land, the taking of booty and 
pillaging are prohibited as barbarous practices, the maritime powers of the most 
civilized continent regard such practices as lawful on the sea.  It is considered 
legitimate to take enemy merchandise when on the high seas,  while it is 
forbidden to take the same merchandise while it rests on the enemy’s docks or 
warehouses.  . . . The moral and juridical contradiction that exists between these 
two kinds of outlook and practice is too flagrant to persist indefinitely.  Or 
rather, the principle that is recognized as necessary, just and salutary in one set 
of facts will come, through the progress of civilization, to triumph overall.  Or 
else, if barbarism is maintained in war at sea, it will end by being revived in war 
on land and bring back to us the brutishness of primitive times.  This last 
 
 94.  See AUGUST WILHELM HEFFTER, DER EUROPÄISCHE VÖLKERRECHT (E.H. 
Schroeder, 1867) (Ger); see also AUGUST WILHELM HEFFTER, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
DE L’EUROPE (J. Bergson, trans., Cotillon 4th ed. 1883) (Fr).  (Rabkin translation) 
 95.  DER EUROPÄISCHE VÖLKERRECHT, supra note 94, at 201–02; LE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL DE L’EUROPE, supra note 94 at 261–62. 
 96.  BEST, supra note 20, at 156. 
 97.  Id.  For text of the Brussels Declaration and brief background on the conference, 
THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 21–28. 
 98.  For text of the Oxford Manual and brief history of its origins, see id at 29–40.   
 99.  Letter from the Earl of Derby [Foreign Minister] to Lord A. Loftus [British 
ambassador to Russia, which had sponsored the Brussels conference] (Jan. 20, 1875), in 
66 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 443, 451 (William Ridgway ed., 1882). 
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alternative is impossible, because it is in opposition with the law of progress 
that governs humanity.  . . . history shows us the naturally right which is subject 
to a gradual evolution, which attests the consoling truth that evolution is 
steadily progressive and that humanity, from barbarism, advances insensibly 
toward a juridical condition that is always more noble and more humane.100 
The argument was embraced by commentators in other European 
countries101 and by Calvo and others in South America.102  Paul Pradier-
Fodere, a French legal scholar who accepted a chair in public law in 
Peru in the late Nineteenth Century, is a notable example.  His multi-
volume treatise endorsed Bluntschili’s doctrine.103 Fodere then added his 
own gloss:  the continuation of older practices allowing seizure of private 
property in wartime was “a stain on the civilization of the Nineteenth 
Century and appears more and more unreasonable as the sentiment of 
solidarity and justice develops among peoples; but it is also necessary 
that these [older] theories, which have come to be exposed for what they 
have been, must be vigorously and victoriously fought by those of liberal 
and generous spirit.”104 He railed against British commentators who 
would make private citizens “responsible for the deeds of their government, 
which they are obliged to obey and which they may often not have 
approved,” a doctrine “that is the height of iniquity.”105 
The book in which Bluntschli argued the point at greatest length was 
cited by the Red Cross Commentary, as among the works that helped 
 
 100.  Johann Caspar Bluntschli, Du Droit de Butin en General et Specialement du 
Droit de Prise Maritime, IX REVUE DE DROIT INT’L 508, 512–13 (1877) [hereinafter Du 
Droit de Butin].  
 101.  PASQUALE FIORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CODIFIED 621 (Translation by Edwin 
Borchard, 1918) (Italian original: IL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE, 1890) (“According to the 
proper laws of war, the property (ships or cargo) of private persons of the enemy should 
be deemed inviolable in naval as well as land war and it is the duty of all civilized states 
to make this rule obligatory . . . .”); FRANTZ DESPAGNET, COURS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC 1071 (Recueil Sirey, 1910) (Fr) (“This inviolability [of enemy private property] 
results from the fundamental principle according to which war is a relation between state 
and state . . . Why is this rule, accepted without difficulty in war on land, contested in 
relation to war at sea, when juridically they are absolutely parallel?”).  (Rabkin translation) 
For extensive compilation of the “great number” of European “publicists” endorsing 
such views, see HENRY BONFILS, MANUEL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC § 1300, at 
914–15 (Librairie Rousseau 7th ed., 1914) (Fr). 
 102.  IV CHARLES CALVO, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL THÉORIQUE ET PRACTIQUE 18 
(1896) (Fr): “. . . if the abolition of prize taking at sea is not yet established in express 
and formal terms in the law of nations, it is at least indicated implicitly and there is every 
ground to hope that the day is approaching when the inviolability of private property at 
sea will be recognized altogether definitively, without challenge or reservation.”  
(Rabkin translation). 
 103.  P. PRADIER-FODÉRÉ, TRAITÉ DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC EUROPEÁN ET 
AMÉRICAIN (1897) (Fr). 
 104.  Id. at 471 (Rabkin translation). 
 105.  Id. at 476. 
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change opinion toward the ideal of embracing civilian immunity from 
war.106  The Commentary does not call attention to the debate about sea 
power. It does not acknowledge the tradition of differing rules for law at 
sea, even in commenting on the AP I provision which clarifies that the 
“Basic Rule” does not generally apply to naval warfare.107  The actual 
dispute was not what the ICRC wanted to notice. What the ICRC embraced 
was the abstract principle and the very abstract doctrine supposed to be 
grounding it. 
IV.  THE BRITISH RESPONSE 
When Nineteenth Century European commentators advanced their 
claims about the proper limits on war, British commentators published 
emphatic rebuttals. First, they invoked the authority of the leading 
commentators of earlier times.  In the 17th Century, the Dutch jurist Hugo 
Grotius and the Italian émigré scholar in England, Alberico Gentili had 
clearly endorsed taking enemy ships and cargoes as prize of war.108  
Additionally, in the 18th Century the Dutch jurist Cornelius Bynkershoek, 
the Swiss diplomat Emer de Vattel, and the Swiss philosopher J -J 
Burlamaqui all believed in taking enemy ships and cargo as prize of 
war.109 
All these eminent commentators wrote before efforts to codify 
international practice in general or “legislative” treaties, subscribed by 
most nations. Consequently, these early commentators expounded 
international law by reference to the most generally accepted practices, 
which they often identified in turn with the law of nature.110 All these 
 
 106.  JOHANN CASPAR BLUNTSCHLI, DAS BEUTERECHT IM KRIEG UND DAS 
SEEBEUTERECHT INSBESONDERE [The Law of Prize in War and Especially the Law of 
Prize at Sea] (1878).  COMMENTARY, supra note 12, at 586.  
 107.   Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 49 (“Scope of Application”:  “The provisions of 
this Section . . . apply to all attacks from the sea or from the air against objectives on 
land but do not otherwise affect the rules of international law applicable in armed 
conflict at sea or in the air.”).  Whether this provision limits blockade tactics which 
might be viewed as aimed at “objectives on land” is a matter of dispute.  See ELMAR 
RAUCH, PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS, REPERCUSSIONS ON THE 
LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE 90–94 (Duncker & Humbolt, 1984). 
 108.  HALL, supra note 85, at 86 (providing extensive citations to 17th and early 
18th Century treatises).  
 109.  Id. (concluding, “[T]o all it was a matter of course that the subjects of an 
enemy state were themselves individually enemies”).   
 110.  For background on the outlook of commentators before the Nineteenth 
Century, see Patrick Capps, “Natural Law and the Law of Nations” and Randall Lesaffer, 
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eminent authorities treated the practice of seizing enemy commerce on 
the seas as consistent with the law of nature.111 The great Eighteenth 
Century Continental treatises, by Vattel and Burlamaqi, featured the 
“law of nature” in their titles, while associating that law with the principles 
of the modern Enlightenment.112  Both were cited with approval by the 
American Founders.113 
British commentators did not deny that states had embraced additional 
humanitarian constraints on the conduct of war.  What they denied was 
that these additions derived from a single, underlying principle—a “master 
principle”—which could be extended by mere logic. William Edward 
Hall put the point this way: 
Springing originally from limitations upon a right [i.e., the right to deploy force 
to coerce enemies], which in its extreme form constitutes a denial of all other 
rights, and developed through the action of practical and sentimental considerations, 
the law of war cannot be expected to show a substructure of large principles, 
like those which underlie the law governing the relations of peace  . . . It is, as a 
matter of fact, made up of a number of usages which in the main are somewhat 
arbitrary, which are not always very consistent with one another, and which do 
not therefore very readily lend themselves to general statements.114 
Hall argued, in effect, for a common law of war formed by gradual 
accretion and adjustment rather than extrapolation from abstract first 
principles.115 
The Cambridge scholar John Westlake echoed Hall’s views. Westlake 
dismissed Rousseau’s doctrine of war as a set of “arbitrary assertions” 
exercising on Europeans “the fascination which extreme doctrines seem 
 
“The Classical Law of Nations” in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE THEORY AND HISTORY 
OF INTERNATIONAL Law (Alexander Orakhelashvill, ed., Edward Elgar, 2011). 
 111.  For classic 18th Century accounts, see 3 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF 
NATIONS 271 (Charles G. Fenwick ed., Carnegie Institution 1916) (right to seize private 
property even from neutral vessels when it may help the enemy). Id. at 291 (general right 
to seize enemy property to reduce enemy capacity to continue fighting). JEAN-JACQUES 
BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW 475 (Liberty Fund, 2006) 
(lawfulness of reprisal against enemy commerce to compensate for enemy attacks). 
 112.  1 EMER DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS, OU PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE, 
APPLIQUÉS À LA CONDUITE AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS [THE LAW OF 
NATIONS, OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT OF THE AFFAIRS OF 
NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS] (1758); JEAN JACQUES BURLAMAQUI, PRINCEPS DU DROIT 
NATUREL [PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW] (1748). 
 113.  See, e.g., JAMES WILSON, COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON (Kermit L. 
Hall & Mark David Hall, eds., Liberty Fund, 2007) (the index shows 12 references to 
Vattel, 10 to Burlamaqui, 18 to John Locke, and 3 to JJ Rousseau.) Wilson was an 
influential figure at the Philadelphia Convention in 1787 and subsequently among the 
first justices of the U.S. Supreme Court.  
 114.  HALL, supra note 85, at 84. 
 115.  Id. 
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to possess, especially when an end is to be served by them.”116  He 
insisted that Rousseau’s account simply could not be taken seriously.117 
The claim that civilians must be exempt from war made little sense in 
principle, according to Westlake, because the purpose of war is not to 
defeat an opposing army, but to “compel the enemy State to accept such 
terms of peace as is desired to impose on it and as a means to that object 
to paralyze the enemy State—that is, to make all action impossible for it 
unless and until it accepts the terms desired.”118 Even on land, the 
“immunity of civilian private property is . . . only admitted so far as it does 
not interfere with any operations deemed to be useful for putting pressure 
on the enemy.”119 The commander of an invading force “would not allow 
the unoccupied part of his enemy’s territory to be enriched or strengthened 
by railway traffic into it from the part which it has occupied or [allow] 
goods lying in the unoccupied part, unproductive for want of transport 
[to be] brought to market by the railways which he controls.”120 On land, 
commanders were acknowledged to have the authority to “requisition” 
supplies from civilian inhabitants—including food, horses, clothing and 
other things necessary to the invading army—imposing extreme hardship 
on local inhabitants.121 
An Anglo-Indian legal scholar, Alma Latifi, a student of Westlake, 
published a short treatise on the subject, Effects of War on Property 
before the First World War.122  The book strongly disputes the claim of 
Continental writers that seizing enemy merchant ships in wartime was 
“inhuman and unworthy of civilized nations.”123 To the contrary, he 
argued, naval war was more humane than land war. “The enormous 
armies of the great Continental powers are like flights of locusts that eat 
up the occupied territory.  They find plenty and leave desolation behind 
them.”124 The “legacy of war on land” was likely to be “acute individual 
distress and widespread social disorder,” as armies smashed their way 
 
 116.  “General Theory of the Relations of Subjects to War,” from Chapters on 
International Law (1894), reprinted in COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 91, at 266–67.  
 117.  Id. (“The levity of mind displayed by such a passage is extraordinary, even for 
a man of Rousseau’s character.”). 
 118.  Id. at 614 (from an essay on “Belligerent Rights at Sea”). 
 119.  Id. at 615. 
 120.  Id. at 616. 
 121.  Id. at 615–16. 
 122.  ALMA LATIFI, EFFECTS OF WAR ON PROPERTY (Macmillan 1909). 
 123.  Id. at 123. 
 124.  Id. at 123–24. 
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through whatever private dwellings or installations fell in their way.125 
By contrast, “property at sea” generally belongs to “the mercantile 
community” and “is intended to earn profits.126 If not interfered with, its 
owners hope to be richer by the adventure than they were before, 
otherwise they would not expose their property to the risks of sea when 
it would be safer at home.”127  Precisely because ocean cargo aimed at 
commercial gain, “every ship and cargo afloat in time of war is insured 
and the effects of capture by the enemy are spread over the whole 
community of merchants and ship owners who pay war premiums.”128 
Meanwhile, however, commerce also provides revenue to states.129 
British commentators also pursued a deeper issue.  What is “the state” 
if not the vehicle for expressing the interest or will of its members?  
Westlake protested that the theory of continental writers assumed that 
citizens could disclaim responsibility for their own government: 
It cannot be too strongly stated that in natural justice there is no power for 
individuals to form themselves into a group and disclaim responsibility for the 
actions of that group.  The individuals who form the groups called states are 
not authorized by natural justice to disclaim responsibility attaching to the 
actions of those states and there is no [international] authority over them to 
impose regulations which such a disclaimer would render necessary [to protect 
victims of the corporate action].  Their own consent as states may take the 
place of legislation [in establishing international standards] but such consent has not 
been given to the assertion that individuals are foreign to a war.130 
While decrying “the legal fallacy” of exempting individuals from the 
consequences of their own government’s actions, Westlake acknowledged 
that approach might have seemed more plausible in earlier times: 
The legal fallacy would not have deceived so many if there had not been a time 
when wars were often made by sovereigns from motives of personal or dynastic 
ambition, which found little echo in subject populations.  The memory of that 
time has helped to cause the notion that individuals are foreign to a war to 
become almost a democratic principle.  But since 1815 there have been no wars 
in Europe which were merely those of ruling persons or families and not those 
of respective combatant nations.  The wars have not necessarily been approved 
by the numerical majority, though this has often been the case, but always they 
have been approved by such a part of the population in each combatant state as 
by its own numbers and influences combined, must for all practical purposes, 
external as well as internal, be regarded as representing the nation.  . . .  External 
as well as internal affairs are more and more directed by the popular will.  . . . 
the popular will brooks resistance abroad as little as at home and when it 
 
 125.  Id. at 124. 
 126.  Id. at 125. 
 127.  Id. at 125. 
 128.  Id. at 124. 
 129.  Id. at 126 (“The most important consideration in modern warfare is that of 
money . . . On what does a country rely more for the sinews of war than on commerce?”). 
 130.  COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 91, at 617. 
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decides on war it will insist as much or more than any monarch on every means 
being employed to win success.131 
English and American writers were not the only ones who embraced 
this traditional view. Paul Boidin, a professor at the French military 
academy, published a book in 1908 on the implications of the Hague 
Peace conferences. He makes no mention of war at sea, but protests at 
length against the principle of Rousseau: 
We cannot associate ourselves with this view [FN:  “even if that means going 
against the preponderance of scholarly opinion in France”].  The state is nothing 
but the gathering of all the individuals who compose it.  So when one says, 
France has declared war on Germany, one means to say that all the French have 
become enemies of all the Germans. France is formed of all its citizens.  In a 
war of survival, it will call on all.  Some, who have the physical capability, will 
serve as combatants, the army at hand; the others, too weak or too old, will 
render service in accord with their capacities, the scientists with their inventions, the 
writers with their writings and patriotic discourses.  . . . It will not do to have 
two sorts of citizens, one destined by nature to get themselves killed, the others 
as mere spectators to the misfortune of the first group.  There can only be one 
kind:  Frenchmen who are ready to sacrifice their goods and even their lives for 
the triumph of their country.If all have the moral obligation to contribute 
according to their means to the success of military operations, it follows that all 
must, logically, share in the suffering of the war.132 
Lassa Oppenheim’s treatise, International Law first appeared in 1906, 
then in a second edition in 1912—and remained in print, with emendations 
by successive editors down to the late Twentieth Century.133  Its tone 
was considerably less flamboyant, but no less emphatic in its rejection of 
the Continental view. Oppenheim, a German émigré to Britain, eventually 
succeeded Westlake to the chair of international law at Cambridge. His 
treatise acknowledged that “the majority of European continental writers” 
had “for the last three generations . . . propagated the doctrine that no 
relation of enmity exists between belligerents [states] and private subjects 
[of opposing states in war],” a doctrine he traced—like the Continental 
 
 131.  Id. at 618. 
 132.  PAUL BOIDIN, LES LOIS DE LA GUERRE ET LES DEUX CONFÉRENCES DE LA HAYE 
[THE LAWS OF WAR AND THE TWO HAGUE CONFERENCES] 37 (A. Pedone ed., 1908) (Fr). 
(Rabkin translation).  
 133.  L. F. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, A TREATISE (2d. ed., Longmans, 
Green, 1912) For a survey of Oppenheim’s career and scholarly legacy, see OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1152–55 (Bardo Fassbender & 
Anne Peters, eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2012) [hereinafter OXFORD HANDBOOK]. The 9th 
edition of Oppenheim’s treatise (annotated by contemporary scholars, Robert Jennings and 
Arthur Watts) was published by Longmans in 1996.    
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writers—to Rousseau.134  Yet, he countered, “British and American-English 
writers [i.e., not Latin American authors] have never adopted this doctrine” 
and concluded, “[I]f the facts of war are taken into consideration without 
prejudice, there ought to be no doubt that the British and American view 
is correct.”135 
Latifi saw colder calculation behind the display of humanitarian sentiment: 
The movement towards abolition of the right to capture private property at sea 
has been supported by many men whose humanitarian motives it is impossible 
to doubt, but the moving springs of the policy of nations are deep-based in their 
solid self-interest.  They are not to be found in the abstract principles preached 
by professors or embodied in the resolutions of peace congresses.136 
There is a succinct term today for  such appropriation of “humanitarian” 
postures by self-interested states:  “lawfare.”137 
The movement towards abolition of the right to capture seemed to 
gain momentum at the Second Hague Peace conference in 1907 and still 
more with the Declaration of London in 1910, promising restrictions on 
interference with civilian commerce.138  They did not survive in the ensuing 
world war. 
V.  AMERICAN VIEWS CONVERGE WITH BRITAIN’S 
In the late 19th Century, Bluntschli and other European commentators 
sometimes claimed the United States as a supporter of the Continental 
perspective. As these commentators noted, the United States had 
persistently urged restraints on seizure of enemy property in war at sea, 
beginning with a treaty negotiated by Benjamin Franklin with the King 
of Prussia in 1785.139 That treaty was celebrated by a Red Cross 
commentator in the 1980s as “the most remarkable document” of its era, 
“containing provisions which rise to the level of principle . . . .”140 The 
Red Cross Commentary on AP-I depicts the Union Army’s law of war 
 
 134.  OPPENHEIM, supra note 133, at 63–64. 
 135.  This edition cites Boidin’s work as authority for the claim about “the facts of 
war.” Id. Oppenheim, acknowledging various treaty and customary restrictions on 
spoiling enemy property in war, concludes (regarding the Bluntschli doctrine as applied 
to land warfare), the “point is unworthy of dispute, because it is only one of terms without any 
material consequence.” Id. at 64. He was much more of a positivist than his predecessors.   
 136.  LATIFI, supra note 122, at 143. 
 137.  The current usage of the term seems to have begun with General Charles 
Dunlap, Law and Military Interventions:  Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Century 
Conflicts (Harvard Univ. Press 2001). 
 138.  For overview of debates on these measures, see CALVIN D. DAVIS, THE UNITED 
STATES AND THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE 303–26 (Duke Univ. Press 1975). 
 139.  See Du Droit de Butin, supra note 100, at 533–35, 549–50.   
 140.  JEAN PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW 21 (Henry Dunant Institute ed., 1985).  
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“code” in the Civil War as a landmark on the path to the international 
conventions of the Twentieth Century, culminating in AP-I.141 The Civil 
War Code, largely the work of the Prussian émigré scholar, Francis 
Lieber, was in fact cited with approval by Bluntschli and other European 
scholars in the Nineteenth Century.142 American diplomats, down to the 
mid-20th Century, sometimes did present the United States as more idealistic 
in its view of war than the older powers of Europe.143 
There is less to this story, however, than might appear from such 
opportunistic citations. On the whole, what is striking is how much 
American doctrine on war paralleled British claims. 
From the very outset, the American Declaration of Independence spoke 
of conflicts between peoples rather than states:  “Nor have we been wanting 
in attentions to our British brethren . . . . We must, therefore . . . hold them, 
as we hold the rest of mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace Friends.”144 
 
 141.  COMMENTARY, supra note 12, at §1823. 
 142.  See, e.g., MODERNE VOLKERRECHT, supra note 72, at § 598; LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
CODIFIE, supra note 72, at 295. 
 143.  A.D. White, leader of the American delegation at the first Hague Peace 
Conference, July 5, 1899:  “Europeans generally suppose that the people of the United 
States is a people eminently practical.  That is true; but it is only one half of the truth; for 
the people of the United States are not only practical; they are still more devoted to the 
ideal.  There is no greater error, when one regards the United States, or when one deals 
with it, than to suppose that its citizens are guided solely by material interests.  . . .  
Americans . . . are idealists also as regards the question of the inviolability of property on 
the sea; this is not merely a question of interest for us; it is a question of right, of justice, 
of progress for the whole world, and so my fellow countrymen feel it to be.” PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, CONFERENCE OF 1899, at 49 (James Brown Scott, ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press 1921). 
 144.  What precedes this statement, in the Declaration’s penultimate paragraph, is a 
protest against the British crown for “waging war “through acts of “cruelty and perfidy 
scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages,” for deploying “foreign Mercenaries to 
complete the works of death,” and for inciting “the merciless Indian savages, whose 
known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of ages, sexes and conditions.”  
The Declaration takes for granted that “the Head of a civilized nation” has a moral 
obligation to enforce rules of restraint in the conduct of war—without denying that war 
is a relation between whole peoples. In fact, attacks on British commercial shipping were 
an important element of American strategy in the ensuing War of Independence. See 
Theodore M. Cooperstein, Letters of Marque and Reprisal:  The Constitutional Law and 
Practice of Privateering, 40 J. MARIT. L. & COMM. 221 (2009) (experience during the War of 
Independence proved to Framers of Constitution that privateering had significant military 
value). 
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Fifty years later, James Kent published Commentaries on American 
Law, which quickly came to be regarded as the American counterpart to 
Blackstone’s Commentaries.145  Kent held firmly to the traditional view: 
When war is duly declared, it is not merely a war between this and the adverse 
government in their political characters.  Every man is, in judgment of law, a 
party to the acts of his own government and a war is between all the individuals 
of the one and all the individuals of which the other nation is composed.146 
For Kent, this followed from the premise that, “Government  is the 
representative of the will of all the people and acts for  the whole 
society.”147 
The logical conclusion, in Kent’s view, was that governments at war 
had a right to seize property belonging to the enemy, even private property, 
though they might by mutual agreement forego some of these claims.148 
Some fifty years later, a 12th edition appeared, with editorial notes by a 
young Oliver Wendell Holmes.149  His annotation simply alerted the reader 
that the reasoning had applied to the American Civil War, though it was 
not a declared war between two internationally recognized states.150 
The same doctrine was embraced by Henry Wheaton’s Elements of 
International Law, which first appeared in 1836.151  Like Kent’s 
Commentaries, it was kept in print for the rest of the century.152  
Wheaton had been court reporter for the Supreme Court (his name appears 
on volumes of the U.S. Reports) and a later edition of his treatise quoted 
a warm endorsement of Wheaton’s scholarship by Chief Justice John 
 
 145.  See, e.g., J.G. MARVIN, LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 437–39 (T & J.W. Johnson, 
1847) (quoting comparisons with Blackstone by English as well as American scholars). 
A 15th edition of Kent’s Commentaries (in four volumes) was published between 1997 
and 2002.   
 146.  I JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 55 (12th ed., Little, Brown, 
1873; reprinted by Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1989).  
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. at 56–60. 
 149.  See id. at vii–viii.  
 150.  Id. at 55, n.1.  
 151.  HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Philadelphia:  Carey, Lea 
& Blanchard, 1836) 
 152. Only thirty years after the original publication, a new edition appeared in 1866, 
edited by Richard Henry Dana—already the eighth edition of the work. HENRY WHEATON, 
ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Boston:  Little, Brown, 1866).  Subsequent editions 
appeared in 1880 and 1916. The 1866 edition was reprinted by Oxford University Press 
in 1836, in its series (sponsored by the Carnegie Institution), “Classics of International 
Law,” putting Wheaton in company with Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel and other European 
classics.  The Oxford-Carnegie edition was reprinted by Hein & Co. in 1995.  French and 
German editions of Wheaton’s treatise appeared in his lifetime. 
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Marshall.153  Wheaton was unflinching in his embrace of the traditional 
view: 
All the members of the enemy state may lawfully be treated as enemies in a 
public war. . . .  From the moment one State is at war with another, it has, on 
general principles, a right to seize on all the enemy’s property, of whatsoever 
kind and wheresover found. . . .154 
Wheaton acknowledged that modern practice had “tended to soften the 
extreme severity of the operations of war by land” but still sanctioned— 
on the old principles—the “indiscriminate capture and confiscation” of 
the “private property of the enemy taken at sea. . . .”155 The post-Civil 
War edition carried an extended footnote by the editor—Richard Henry 
Dana, who had prosecuted Union prize claims during the Civil War—156 
defending the practice of seizing enemy merchant ships and cargoes as a 
legitimate tactic of war, because it was less likely to cause extreme hardship 
to civilians than seizures on land.157 
 
 153.  For Wheaton’s career and scholarly legacy, see OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra 
note 133, at1132–36. The sixth edition of WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(Little, Brown, 1855) includes a long introductory essay by William Beach Lawrence 
(who provided updating annotations for that edition), which excerpts endorsements of 
Wheaton’s scholarship by John Marshall at lv.  
 154.  ELEMENTS, supra note 152, at 362–63.  
 155.  Id. at 378. 
 156.  Dana is better known for his sailing memoir, TWO YEARS BEFORE THE MAST 
(1840), but as a U.S. Attorney during the Civil War, he took part in arguments before the 
Supreme Court in what are now known as The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1863).  
 157.  “War is the exercise of force by bodies politic for the purpose of coercion.  
Modern civilization has recognized certain modes of coercion as justifiable.  This 
exercise upon material interests is preferable to acts of force upon the person.  Where 
private property is taken, it is because it is of such a character or so situated as to make 
its capture a justifiable means of coercing the power with which we are at war.  . . . The 
humanity or policy of modern times have abstained from the taking of private property 
not liable to direct use in war, when on land.  Some of the reasons for this are the infinite 
varieties of the character of such property from things almost sacred, to those purely 
merchantable; the difficulty of discriminating among the varieties; the need of much of it 
to support the life of the non-combatant persons and of animals; the unlimited range of 
places and objects that would be opened to the military; and the moral dangers attending 
searches and captures in households and among non-combatants.  But on the high seas, 
these reasons do not apply.  Strictly personal effects are not taken.  Cargoes are purely 
merchandize.  Merchandise sent to sea is sent voluntarily, embarked by merchants on an 
enterprise of profit, taking the risks of war; its value is usually capable of compensation 
in money and may be protected by insurance; it is in the custody of men trained and paid 
for the purpose; and the sea, upon which it is sent, is res omnium, the common field of 
war as well as commerce.  The purpose of maritime commerce is the enriching of the 
owner by the transit over this common field; and it is the usual object of revenue to the 
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Just on the eve of the Civil War, Henry Halleck’s International Law 
followed the same doctrine: war “makes all subjects of the one state the 
legal enemies of each and every subject of the other” and “this results 
from political ties and not from personal feelings and personal antipathies; 
their status is that of legal hostility.”158 Halleck’s treatise was so congenial 
to English views that second and third editions were prepared by a 
London publisher, with annotations by a British barrister.159 The editor 
found nothing to complain of in Halleck’s treatment of war—a main 
theme of the treatise. Halleck had taught at West Point and returned to 
active service as a senior commander of Union armies in the West at the 
outset of the Civil War.160 
It was Halleck who commissioned Professor Lieber to draw up the 
famous code, issued to the army in the spring of 1863 as General Order 
100, “Instructions to the Army in the Field.”161  The code offered a number 
of admonitions regarding necessary restraints in war by nations that are 
not “uncivilized.”162 It explained that “protection of the inoffensive 
citizen of the hostile country is the rule”163 and specifically denounced 
“wanton violence” and “all robbery, pillage or sacking, even after taking 
a place by main force.”164 It also admonished that “private property, unless 
forfeited by crimes or offenses of the owner, can be seized only by way 
of military necessity,” but then defined “necessity” as anything conducive 
to the “support or other benefit of the army or of the United States.”165 
At the most basic level, the code embraced the traditional view that 
under conditions of “civilized existence . . . men live in political, continuous 
 
power under whose government the owner resides.” HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 378–79, n.171 (Richard Henry Dana ed., 1866). 
 158.  HENRY WAGER HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 411 (Bancroft, 1861). 
 159.  See HENRY WAGER HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW (Sir Sherston Baker, ed., 
K. Paul, 3d ed. 1893). 
 160.  For background on Halleck’s career and his early relations with Francis 
Lieber, see JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE, THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
188–92 (Free Press 2012).  
 161.  “Lieber Code,” reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 
3–20.  On the origins of the code, see Witt, supra note 160, at 226–47, acknowledging 
that “Abraham Lincoln took no role in commissioning the code” nor did he “participate 
in editing or revising the code” but he “approved the code because . . . it expressed a 
view of military necessity very close to that which Lincoln had been developing . . . .”  
For background on Lieber’s own career and scholarly influence, see OXFORD HISTORY, 
supra note 133, 1137–41.  
 162.  Art. 24–25:  Contrasting practice of “barbarous armies” and “uncivilized 
people” with “modern regular wars of the Europeans and their descendants in other 
portions of the globe,” where the latter provide “protection to the inoffensive citizen of 
the hostile country” as “the rule.” 
 163.  LIEBER, supra note 161, art. 25. 
 164.  Id. art. 44. 
 165.  Id. art 38. 
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societies, forming organized units, called states or nations, whose 
constituents bear, enjoy, suffer, advance and retrograde together in peace 
and war.166 The citizen or native of a hostile country is thus an enemy, as 
one of the constituents of the hostile state or nation, and as such is subjected 
to the hardships of war.”167 
So far, from exalting protection of “civilians”—a term it does not ever 
use—Lieber’s Code noted that the “more vigorously wars are pursued, 
the better it is for humanity. Sharp wars are brief.”168 The penultimate 
provision advises the military commander to “throw the burden of the 
war, as much as lies within his power, on the disloyal citizens of the 
revolted portion or province, subjecting them to stricter police than the 
noncombatant enemies have to suffer in regular war” and for this purpose 
“he may expel, transfer, imprison or fine the revolted citizens who refuse 
to pledge themselves anew as citizens obedient to the law and loyal to 
the government.”169 
Barely a year after the issuance of this code, General William T. Sherman 
marched his troops from Atlanta to the sea.  They seized food as they 
marched, deliberately devastated farms and equipment, tore up railroad 
tracks in a zone of destruction fifty miles wide and three hundred miles 
long.170 Sherman’s March was denounced as a descent to “barbarity”— 
in the South.171 Almost at the same time, General Philip Sheridan devastated 
farms in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia.172  In both cases, commanders 
seem to have cautioned against direct attacks on civilian persons, even 
while wrecking property.173 
 
 166.  Id. art. 45. 
 167.  Id. arts. 20–21. 
 168.  Id. art. 29. 
 169.  Id. art. 156. 
 170.  MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM, supra note 63, at 808–11. 
 171.  MARK GRIMSLEY, THE HARD HAND OF WAR, UNION MILITARY POLICY TOWARD 
SOUTHERN CIVILIANS 1861–1865, at 211 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1995).  
 172.  See MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM, supra note 63, at 778–79. 
 173.  Modern historians acknowledge that devastation of infrastructure was 
conducted with a good deal of continuing restraint.  See, e.g., GRIMSLEY, supra note 171, 
at 222–25; BEST, supra note 20, at 211 (“Upon the whole, a proper distinction was 
preserved between property and persons; which, after all, from the viewpoint of the law 
of war, was the main thing.”); J.H. RANDALL & DAVID DONALD, THE CIVIL WAR AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 431 (2d ed. 1966).  Major northern newspapers saluted humanitarian 
restraint: in its August 8, 1864 edition, The New York Times praised a Union commander 
leading a raid in northern Alabama for attacking “a depot of rebel stores and a factory. 
These were very properly burnt, but the adjacent houses of the citizens were saved by the 
personal exertions of the General and his soldiers—the latter putting their own wet 
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In post-war memoirs, both Sherman himself and General Grant (in 
overall command of all armies by the time of Sherman’s Georgia campaign) 
insisted that instances of rape and murder were rare and often the work 
of local bandits rather than Union soldiers.174 Grant and Sherman did not 
at all deny, however, that these operations had aimed at destroying 
private property. Sherman included in his memoir a report he sent to 
Halleck, acknowledging that the purpose of his march was not solely to 
rob the enemy of resources: 
I attach much more importance to these deep incisions into the enemy’s country, 
because the purpose of this war differs from European wars in this particular:  
we are not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people, and must make old 
and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war, as well as their organized 
armies.  I know that this recent movement of mine has had a wonderful effect in 
this respect.  Thousands who had been deceived by their lying newspapers to 
believe that we are being whipped all the time now realize the truth, and have 
no appetite for a repetition of the same experience.  To be sure, Jeff. Davis has 
his people under pretty good discipline, but I think faith in him is much shaken 
in Georgia, and before we have done with her, South Carolina will not be quite 
so tempestuous.175 
General Halleck, the former treatise writer who had commissioned 
Lieber’s code, congratulated Sherman on his performance in Georgia and 
suggested that still more destruction would not be condemned, as 
Sherman’s troops marched into South Carolina.176  Sheridan also 
acknowledged the political implications of his devastation in the 
 
blankets on the roofs.” The general, as the Times noted, was L.H. Rousseau—though it 
made nothing of the name, still not one for Americans to reckon with, when thinking 
about war.  GRIMSLEY, supra note 171, at 181.  
 174.  MEMOIRS OF W.T. SHERMAN 659 (2d. ed., 1885) (reprinted by Library of 
America, 1990) (“No doubt, many acts of pillage, robbery and violence were committed 
by [the army’s] parties of foragers, usually called ‘bummers;’ for I have since heard of 
jewelry taken from women, and the plunder of articles that never reached the commissary; but 
these acts were exceptional and incidental.”). PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U.S. GRANT 646 
(1885) (reprinted by Library of America, 1990) (“Georgia . . . even liberated the State 
convicts under promise from them that they would serve in the army.  I have but little 
doubt that the worst acts that were attributed to Sherman’s army were committed by 
these convicts and by other Southern people . . . who took advantage of their country 
being invaded to commit crime.”).  
 175.  MEMOIRS OF W.T. SHERMAN, supra note 174, at 705 (letter from Sherman to 
Halleck dated Dec. 24, 1864). 
 176.  Id. at 700  (letter from Halleck to Sherman dated Dec. 18, 1864) (“Should you 
capture Charleston, I hope that by some accident the place may be destroyed, and if a 
little salt should be sown upon its site, it may prevent the growth of future crops of 
nullification and secession.”). Sherman acknowledged the suggestion: “I will bear in 
mind your hint as to Charleston and do not think ‘salt’ will be necessary. . .The truth is, 
the whole army is burning with an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance upon South 
Carolina.  I almost tremble for her fate, but feel that she deserves all that seems in store 
for her.”  Id. at 705. 
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Shenandoah Valley: “This may not be war but rather statesmanship.”177 
Lieber expressed private misgivings about looting and vandalism by 
Sherman’s army, but praised Sherman’s overall strategy.178 The aim was 
not to seize and hold territory, but to impose a cost on Confederate 
populations away from the main theaters of conflict and to deny resources 
from these regions to the main armies.179 
The Lieber Code explicitly sanctioned harsh tactics, using civilian 
suffering as leverage on the enemy: “It is lawful to starve  the hostile 
belligerent, armed or unarmed, so that it leads to the speedier subjection 
of the enemy.”180 Civilians could, in effect, be held hostage: “When a 
commander of a besieged place expels the noncombatants, in order to 
lessen the number of those who consume his stock of provisions, it is 
lawful though an extreme measure, to drive them back, so as to hasten 
on the surrender.”181  When planning to “bombard a place” with non-
military residents—threatening lives as well as property—commanders 
were advised to “inform the enemy of their intention  . . . so that 
noncombatants, and especially the women and children, may be removed 
before the bombardment commences.”182 
The same provision, however, immediately acknowledged that “it is 
no infraction of the common law of war to omit thus to inform the enemy. 
Surprise may be a necessity.”183 The Code then follows this local, tactical 
rule with the very general, abstract reflection—as if it were a justifying 
principle—that the “constituents” of “states or nations” must “bear, enjoy, 
suffer, advance and retrograde together” and the “citizen . . . of a hostile 
 
 177.  1 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF P.H. SHERIDAN 267 (1888) (“Death is popularly 
considered the maximum punishment in war, but it is not; reduction to poverty brings 
prayers for peace more surely and more quickly than does the destruction of human life, 
as the selfishness of man has demonstrated in more than one great conflict.”). 
 178.  Witt, supra note 160, at 280 (summarizing Lieber’s letters discussing Sherman’s 
March:  “Here at last was a Union commander who seemed to grasp the nature of Lieber’s 
fierce thinking about war.”). 
 179.  On the general strategy behind such “raids,” see GRIMSLEY, supra note 171, at 
162–70 (comparing Sherman’s March in Georgia to destructive raids in the Shenandoah 
Valley and elsewhere, designed to deprive the enemy of agricultural resources and 
transportation links). 
 180.  LIEBER, supra note 161, art. 17. 
 181.  Id. art. 18. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id. art. 19. 
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country is thus an enemy . . . and as such is subjected to the hardships of 
war.”184 
President Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation was also justified as a 
war measure.185  It was, by the law of that time, a confiscation of private 
property, by far the largest in American history.186 If confiscation were a 
punishment for supporting the rebellion as congressional confiscation 
acts indicated,187 why shouldn’t loyal slave owners have their property 
returned, even if they happened to live in states that had voted to secede? 
Former Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Curtis of New Hampshire argued 
that point with much earnestness in an 1863 pamphlet.188 
Depicting the liberation of slaves as a war measure made it much 
easier to defend.  In the first year of the war, Union commander Benjamin 
Butler, holding a Union base at Hampton, Virginia, had to decide what 
to do with runaway slaves.  He described them as “contraband,” which 
could lawfully be withheld from owners on the same theory that military 
supplies would be blocked from delivery to enemy territory in wartime.189  
President Lincoln, himself, emphasized that emancipation was a military 
measure, depriving the rebel states of manpower.190 He implicitly conceded 
that it might involve physical danger, cautioning, in the final version of 
 
 184.  Id. arts. 20, 21. 
 185.  BURRUS M. CARNAHAN, ACT OF JUSTICE, LINCOLN’S EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION 
AND THE LAW OF WAR 117–33 (Univ. Press of Kentucky 2007) (“The Proclamation as a 
Weapon of War”).  For further background, see STEPHEN NEFF, JUSTICE IN BLUE AND 
GRAY 139–42 (Harvard Univ. Press 2010). 
 186.  The Lieber Code, supra note 161, confidently asserted that when slaves 
escaped to territory held by the Union army, they could never be returned to slavery 
since that “would amount to enslaving a free person and neither the United States nor 
any officer under their authority can enslave any human being.” (art. 43)  Others found 
the issue much less clear, perhaps recalling pre-war federal legislation requiring federal 
marshals to seize and return escaped slaves to their masters.  NEFF, supra note 185. 
 187.  CARNAHAN, supra note 185, at 83–92  (on congressional “confiscation” legislation). 
 188.  See BENJAMIN CURTIS, “Executive Power” in UNION PAMPHLETS OF THE CIVIL 
WAR (Frank Freidel ed., 1967) (“This penalty [of confiscation of slaves] . . . is not to be 
inflicted [exclusively] on those persons who have been guilty of treason . . . .  It is not, 
therefore, as a punishment of guilty persons, that the commander-in-chief decrees the 
freedom of slaves.  It is upon the slaves of loyal persons, or of those who, from their 
tender years or other disability, cannot be either disloyal or otherwise, that the proclamation is 
to operate if at all . . . . so far as I know, no source of these powers other than the authority of 
the commander-in-chief in time of war, has ever been suggested.”) (emphasis added). 
 189.  NEFF, supra note 185, at 131–33. 
 190.  CARNAHAN, supra note 185, at 134–38 (citing Lincoln’s reply to a critic, “Is 
there—has there ever been—any question that by the law of war, property, both of 
enemies and friends, may be taken when needed? And is it not needed whenever taking 
it, helps us, or hurts the enemies?  . . . Civilized belligerents do all in their power to help 
themselves or hurt the enemy, except a few things regarded as barbarous or cruel. 
Among the exceptions are the massacre of vanquished foes, and non-combatants, male 
and female.”). 
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the Proclamation that affected slaves should “refrain from all violence, 
except in necessary self-defense.”191 
Lincoln had started the war by repudiating calls to abolish slavery.  He 
personally countermanded actions by local commanders to liberate 
slaves in specific theaters.192  Only after a year and a half of inconclusive 
battles did Lincoln agree to deploy this measure of “hard war.”193  Even 
then, Lincoln resisted calls to extend emancipation to states not in rebellion 
or areas that had already submitted to Union control before January 1, 
1863, when Emancipation went into effect.194 A wider emancipation, in 
his view, could not be justified as an exercise of unilateral presidential 
war powers and so could only be accomplished by a constitutional  
amendment.195 Still, it was Lincoln’s exercise of that war power against 
regions still in rebellion that made the Thirteenth Amendment politically 
feasible by war’s end.196 
In some ways, the Lincoln administration had prepared the ground for 
such measures in the first weeks of the war. At the outset, it imposed a 
naval blockade on southern ports and announced that it would be 
conducted in accord with international standards—effectively designating 
the conflict with the Confederacy as something akin to “war.”197 One 
object of the blockade was to prevent rebel states from importing military 
supplies (designated by writers on the law of nations as “absolute  
contraband”).198 Another aim, quite openly avowed, was to prevent the 
 
 191.  Final Emancipation Proclamation, Jan. 1, 1863, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES 
AND WRITINGS, 1859-1865, at 425 (1989) (“And I hereby enjoin upon the people so 
declared to be free to abstain from all violence, unless in necessary self-defence . . .”).  
There was no counterpart to this injunction in the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, 
issued Sept. 22, 1862. Id. at 368.  
 192.  CARNAHAN, supra note 185, at 71–78 (suggesting Lincoln made a deliberate 
display of hesitation in order to give credibility to the later claim of military necessity); 
NEFF, supra note 185, at 128–39 (emphasizing genuine doubts about legal authority to 
liberate slaves by executive order). 
 193.  GRIMSLEY, supra note 171, at 121–41 (associating Emancipation with abandonment 
of earlier policy aimed at conciliation of the South). 
 194.  NEFF, supra note 185, at 140.  
 195.  For background on legal debates, see generally NEFF, supra note 185, at 128–
49; CARNAHAN, supra note 185, at 137–38. 
 196.  NEFF, supra note 185, at 144–49 (tracing legal uncertainties about effects of 
Emancipation even after adoption of 13th Amendment).  CARNAHAN, supra note 185, at 
139–42 (defending Emancipation Proclamation as bridge to “Radical Recognition of 
Freedom”). 
 197.  NEFF, supra note 185, at 32–34. 
 198.  Id. 
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South from exporting cotton and other commodities to foreign markets, 
so as to starve it of revenue.199 
The blockade was supposed to close all the ports of all the states in 
rebellion.200  The accepted view, at least among European governments, 
was that a blockade could only close an enemy port by stationing enough 
warships outside to stop any other ships from entering or leaving.201 This 
was not a traditional blockade. The Confederate coastline stretched some 
3,500 miles from the Potomac to the Rio Grande, with 189 harbors where 
cargo could be landed.202 When the Union declared its blockade, it had only 
twelve warships on hand to enforce it.203  Merchant ships, particularly 
smaller and faster ones, always had good odds of “running” the blockade; 
slipping in and out of southern ports before they could be detected or 
stopped by the Union navy.204 Not until the last year of the war did the 
Union Navy catch even a bare majority of blockade running ships.205 
Even sporadic Union naval patrols could hope to deter foreign ships 
from running the risks of interception, if such interception carried a high 
price.  From the outset, therefore, ships caught trying to run the blockade 
were not merely diverted or detained, but claimed as prize of war,206 with 
the government taking half the proceeds and the naval crews who made 
the seizures taking the rest, as incentive for vigilance.207 Despite protests 
from foreign governments,208 commerce with southern ports dwindled. 
 
 199.  MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM, supra note 63, at 383–87 (describing 
initial Confederate attempt to coerce foreign intervention by embargoing shipments of 
cotton, thus tightening Union grip on Confederate exports). 
 200.  “Proclamation of Blockade,” 19 April 1861, reprinted in 2 LINCOLN 233. 
 201.  According to the 1856 Declaration of Paris, issued by the powers assembled to 
conclude peace after the Crimean War, “Blockades, to be binding, must be effective, that 
is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the 
enemy.” Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, April 16, 1856 [hereinafter Declaration 
of Paris]. On French objections to the legality of the Union blockade, given the 
disproportion between Union naval strength and the extent of the Confederate coast, see 
LEMNITZER, supra note 87, at 117–21. 
 202.  JAMES M. MCPHERSON, WAR ON THE WATERS, THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE 
NAVIES, 1861-1865, at 25 (2012). 
 203.  Id.  
 204.  MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM, supra note 63, at 380 (reporting 
estimates that nine out of ten blockade runners evaded Union patrols in 1861 and perhaps 
five of six over the course of the war). 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  NEFF, supra note 185, at 187–90.  
 207.  MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM, supra note 63, at 378. 
 208.  NEFF, supra note 185, at 199 (protests from France and Prussia); LEMNITZER, 
supra note 87, at 117–21, 139–43 (British acquiescence).  
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Exports of cotton—the South’s great source of revenue—shrank to less 
than ten per cent of pre-war levels.209 
In the North, the main controversy was not whether this approach was 
consistent with international law, but whether international law actually 
applied, given that the Union did not recognize the Confederacy as an 
independent state and was fighting to prevent it from becoming so.210 
When challenges to the seizure of naval prizes came before the Supreme 
Court in 1863, the majority affirmed the seizures as consistent with the 
law of war: 
The right of one belligerent . . . to cripple [the enemy’s] resources by the seizure 
or destruction of his property is a necessary result of a state of war.  Money and 
war, the products of agriculture and commerce, are said to be the sinews of war 
and are as necessary in its conduct as numbers and physical force.  Hence it is 
that the laws of war recognize the right of a belligerent to cut these sinews of 
the power of the enemy by capturing his property on the high seas.211 
The United States had not always relied on prevailing international 
standards.  In 1785, Benjamin Franklin negotiated a treaty with emissaries 
of Frederick the Great, by which both countries agreed to foreswear 
privateering attacks on each other’s commerce in time of war.212 More 
 
 209.  MCPHERSON, WAR ON WATERS, supra note 202, at 225. Somewhere between 
half a million and a million bales of cotton were exported from Confederate ports in the 
last three years of the war, compared with ten million in the last three years before the 
war. Id. Because blockade runners had to be small and quick and insurance rates on 
bulky equipment skyrocketed, the South could still import smaller items, like rifles and 
gunpowder, but not bulkier products, like railroad equipment and machinery—at a time 
when keeping rails lines operating was especially important, as the Union blockade 
interfered so much with coastal shipping; McPherson concludes from recent economic 
studies that “without a blockade, the Confederacy might well have prevailed” in the war. 
Id. The Navy not only interrupted normal commerce but tried to stop Confederate efforts 
to replace imports: when it could not import salt from abroad—a crucial commodity for 
preserving meat and tanning hides—the Confederates tried to recover salt from seawater, 
but Union gunboats “raided hundreds of saltworks” which “helped drive the price of salt 
in the Confederacy to unimaginable heights and exacerbated the inflation that almost 
wrecked the Confederate economy.” Id. at 183. 
 210.  NEFF, supra note 185, at 32–34. 
 211.  Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 671. Even the four dissenters accepted that seizures of 
ships and cargoes would be proper, under a lawful state of war; they objected to seizures 
undertaken solely on the authority of presidential proclamation, before Congress had 
formally authorized blockade measures.  
 212.  Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Sept.10, 1785, Art. XX, WILLIAM MALLOY, 
TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER 
POWERS, 1776-1909, at 1483 (1910). On Prussia’s motives, see Letter from Baron Thulemeier 
to the Commissioners (May 3, 1785), in 2 DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED 
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than a century later, a prominent European commentator saluted this treaty 
as the work of “a philosopher king and a prince among philosophers.”213 
At least the spirit of Franklin’s treaty continued to be embraced in America. 
Only a few decades after Franklin’s negotiations with King Frederick, 
President James Monroe urged a general convention against privateering 
as a measure, which the “friends of humanity” would recognize as an 
“essential amelioration to the condition of the human race.”214 
The United States was not prepared to forego privateering, however, 
so long as foreign navies retained the right to raid merchant shipping on 
the high seas. Two years after the treaty with Prussia, the framers of the 
new Constitution included the power to issue “letters of marque and 
reprisal”—authorizing private attacks on enemy commerce—among the 
powers of the new Congress.215 Within the first decade under the new 
Constitution, Congress did exercise this power, authorizing letters of 
marque to attack French commerce in the ‘quasi war’ of the late 1790s.216  
The United States then unleashed privateering attacks on British commerce 
in the war of 1812.217  In the next decade, American negotiators secured 
a new treaty with Prussia that dropped all mention of repudiating 
privateering.218 
 
STATES FROM THE SIGNING OF THE DEFINITIVE TREATY OF PEACE TO THE ADOPTION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 304 (1833).  The foreign minister for Frederick the Great acknowledged 
that this was an easy concession for Prussia:  The king “flatters himself that the United 
States . . . will perceive the desire of his Majesty to give them proofs of friendship, 
inasmuch as he does not equip cruising vessels, and that consequently his subjects are 
not enabled to make prizes at sea.”  Id.  
 213.  Statement of the Russian delegate, Prof. Fyodor Martens (while presiding at 
the plenary session), Second Hague Peace Conference, July 17, 1907, 3 PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, CONFERENCE OF 1907, at 823 (James Brown Scott, ed., 
1921).  Martens seems to have intended the characterization as a caution against giving 
that treaty too much weight as historical precedent:  these philosophical negotiators, he 
went on to remark, “had few illusions concerning the practical effect of the agreement; 
for they both knew that war between their countries was very unlikely.”  Id.  
 214.  James Monroe, Seventh Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 2, 1823),  2 MESSAGES 
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 779 (JAMES RICHARDSON, ed., 1897). 
 215.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 216.  ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI-WAR: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF 
THE UNDERCLARED WAR WITH FRANCE 124–30 (Scribner 1966). 
 217.  NATHAN MILLER, THE U.S. NAVY, A HISTORY 71–72 (Naval Institute Press, 
3d. ed., 1997). 
 218.  Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Prussia, art. XIII, May 1, 1828, Malloy, 
Treaties, 1496. This new treaty was negotiated in Washington under the watchful eye of 
President John Quincy Adams, who came to office with more diplomatic experience than 
any of his predecessors (as Secretary of State, he had drafted the Monroe Doctrine and 
negotiated the acquisition of Florida and the extension of American territorial claims to 
the Pacific Northwest). Id.  The terms of this treaty (extended to the entire German empire) 
remained in effect into the Twentieth Century. Id. Its one departure from standard trade 
treaties was its stipulation (Art. XIII) that in wartime, ships of each state would not be 
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At the peace conference following the Crimean war, European powers 
issued the Declaration of Paris, which proclaimed privateering unlawful.219 
The United States declined to subscribe to the declaration, insisting that 
so long as attacks on commerce were still permitted to regular navies, 
“the dominion of the seas will be surrendered to those powers which adopt 
the policy and have the means of keeping up large navies.”220 
The Civil War put the whole dispute in a new light. The Confederate 
government announced that it would authorize naval raids on commercial 
shipping of the Union, as a tactic of war.221 A handful of Confederate 
raiders did manage to sink several dozen American merchant ships in 
waters off the coasts of Britain and France.222  The Lincoln administration 
belatedly notified European powers that the United States would endorse 
the ban on privateering in the Declaration of Paris. The administration 
also announced its readiness to treat Confederate privateers as pirates, 
arguing that if privateering was no longer a lawful war measure, practitioners 
were guilty of sheer piracy.223 Since piracy was punishable by death,224 it 
was a quite serious threat. The Confederate government then announced 
its readiness to retaliate by executing Union prisoners in its custody.225 
Efforts to impose criminal sentences on captured Confederate sea raiders 
were quietly abandoned.226 
What was not abandoned was the ever-tightening blockade of southern 
ports.  The United States thus insisted that it was wrong to attack merchant 
 
seized by the other’s navy while enforcing a blockade—unless the blockade breaker 
ignored an initial warning to go back.  
 219.  For the diplomatic and political background of the provision on privateering, 
see LEMNITZER, supra note 87, at 57–95 (stressing European eagerness to secure American 
commitment to the privateering ban, to the extent that some described it as a “moral 
league of nations against the U.S.”).  
 220.  Letter of Mr. Marcy, Secretary of State to Mr. Mason, (Jul. 29, 1856), reprinted in, 
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 385, 488 (Francis Wharton, 
ed., 2d ed. 1887). 
 221.  MILLER, supra note 217, 133.  
 222.  Id. at 134–37. 
 223.  Secretary of State Seward argued that if the United States subscribed to the 
Declaration of Paris, European powers would be obligated to treat Confederate privateers 
as pirates.  When Britain not only rejected this view but allowed Confederate agents to 
secure a raiding ship from British ship-builders, the Lincoln administration gave serious 
thought to unleashing Union privateers on British commerce.  LEMNITZER, supra note 
87, at 134–38.  
 224.  NEFF, supra note 185, at 20. 
 225.  Id. 
 226.  Id. at 23–24. 
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shipping on the other side of the world, certainly wrong when the attackers 
did not exercise the force of a regular navy. At the same time, however, 
the United States asserted the right to blockade the enemy’s own ports 
and coasts and enforce this blockade by seizing blockade runners and 
their cargoes as prize of war.227  The distinction was even more tenuous 
because in the course of the Civil War, the United States claimed the right 
not only to seize ships trying to make for Confederate ports, but also 
ships bound for nearby ports (as in Mexico) from which goods might be 
taken overland to the Confederacy.228 The United States also claimed the 
right to interfere with shipping at a greater distance, if cargoes might be 
“trans-shipped” to blockade runners from neutral ports in the Caribbean.229 
These distinctions might seem somewhat legalistic or dubious, but the 
United States continued to pursue them in later years. In 1898, President 
McKinley proposed to initiate negotiations for an international treaty to 
outlaw wartime capture of private property at sea.230 At the very time he 
made that proposal, the United States Navy was seizing commercial ships 
as prize of war in the course of enforcing a close blockade of Cuba in the 
war with Spain.231 
At the first Hague Peace conference the following year, the United 
States urged the delegates to consider a convention “extending to strictly 
private property at sea the immunity from destruction or capture by 
belligerent powers which such property enjoys on land.”232 The American 
proposal did not, however, seek to ban blockades. It did not even oppose 
seizure of contraband—that is, goods that could be seized in wartime 
 
 227.  Id. at 189. 
 228.  Id. at 197–99. 
 229.  Id. at 199–200. The aggressiveness of American naval measures provoked 
protests from the French and Prussian governments, but British criticism was more 
muted, as specialists in prize law realized that precedents established by the U.S. Navy 
might prove quite advantageous to Britain’s navy in the next war. Id. When the United 
States protested the reach of British blockade measures in the first years of the First 
World War, British authorities duly cited these precedents in response. MCPHERSON, 
WAR ON WATERS, supra note 202, at 21.  It seems to have been British prompting in the 
first place which persuaded the Lincoln administration to declare an international 
blockade of the entire Confederate coast rather than closing of specific ports (implying 
they were otherwise under Confederate control). Id. 
 230.  William McKinley, Second Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 5, 1898), reprinted 
in 15 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 214, at 113–14. 
 231.  See Pacqete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (made famous, at least to law 
students, from the subsequent prize proceedings over the commercial fishing boat which 
the Supreme Court ordered returned to owners—not because it was civilian but because, 
as the Court concluded, there was a special rule recognized in international law, exempting 
local fishing boats from blockade measures.). For background on U.S. proposals in that 
era, see JOHN BASSETT MOORE, THE PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 61–68 (HARPER & 
BROS., 1918).   
 232.  Id. at 62. 
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because consigned to enemy ports and likely to be of direct benefit to the 
enemy’s war efforts.233 
The United States also pointedly rejected the doctrine urged by European 
commentators, that attacks on commerce were inherently contrary to the 
humanitarian principles of war because aimed at private property. At the 
first Hague Peace Conference in 1899, the chief American delegate, Andrew 
Dickson White, did advocate a ban on seizing civilian commerce on the 
seas.234 He insisted that previous advocates had hurt the case for such a 
measure, by tying it to untenable abstract doctrines.235 History had proven, 
he said, that such seizures of enemy shipping did not have a decisive 
effect on the outcome of war, though they could impose severe hardship 
on particular ships or shippers.236 White was talking, however, about attacks 
on American merchant ships by Confederate raiders—not about the Union 
blockade.  He described “the maintenance of a blockade” as the “only 
effective measure” for winning a war “by the action of a navy.”237 
By recognized rules of naval war at the time—and by Union practice 
in the Civil War—“blockade” enforcement also allowed seizure of ships 
on the high seas, if they were carrying “contraband” goods to the enemy.  
What goods could be treated as “contraband”?  White specifically  
disclaimed any interest in having the conference decide whether “coal, 
breadstuffs, also rice” could be designated as “contraband of war.”238 
The pattern was confirmed at the Second Hague Conference in 1907.  
The new leader of the American delegation, Rufus Choate, gave a long 
and learned speech in favor of outlawing attacks on enemy commerce on 
the seas—but with the caveat that this prohibition would not apply to 
 
 233.  Id. at 62; see also CALVIN DEARMOND DAVIS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
FIRST HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE 127–36 (CORNELL PRESS 1962) (behind the scenes, the 
naval expert in the U.S. delegation, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan—already famous as a 
theorist of “sea power”—actually opposed limits on capture of private property at sea, 
which seems to have made White—a former history professor and diplomat—more cautious 
in pressing for wide-ranging constraints on naval action.). 
 234.  Speech of A.D. White at Plenary Conference, Fifth Meeting (July 5, 1899), 
reprinted in PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, TRANSLATIONS OF THE 
OFFICIAL TEXTS, THE CONFERENCE OF 1899, at 48 (James Brown Scott, ed., Oxford Press 
1920). 
 235.  Id.  (“[M]ore harm than good has been done by some of the arguments which 
have likened private property at sea to private property on the land in time of war.”).  
 236.  Id.  White insisted that “all the world knows that this use of privateers [by 
Confederates in the Civil War] had not the slightest effect in terminating or even 
shortening the war”—something he could not have said about the Union blockade. 
 237.  Id.  
 238.  Id.  
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blockade measures.239  When the American proposal encountered opposition 
from Britain and other leading naval powers, Brazil proposed a simpler 
expedient:  amending the provision in the Hague rules on land warfare 
which prohibited destruction or seizure of private property, so it would 
apply equally to such acts on the seas as on land.240  On this proposal, 
the United States joined Britain, France, Russia and others in opposition 
—though Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy and a majority of others 
supported it.241  The U.S. delegation did vote for a Belgian proposal that 
would have allowed merchant ships to be seized on condition that they 
be returned at the end of hostilities.242  This compromise proposal— 
successfully opposed by Britain and other naval powers—could gain 
American support, because it expressly exempted from its coverage those 
ships seized “by virtue of the rules concerning blockade or contraband of 
war.”243 
The Second Peace Conference made little progress in resolving the 
main disputes about limits on naval warfare. A convention on naval 
seizures imposed modest restraints to protect mail delivery and the crews 
of merchant ships.244  It was quickly ratified by most participating states.  
There was much more resistance to a proposed convention that would 
have established an international prize court to judge the legality of 
seizures of neutral ships or cargoes.245 A proposed Declaration of London, 
 
 239.  III PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, TRANSLATIONS OF OFFICIAL 
TEXTS, CONFERENCE OF 1907, at 752–67 (James Brown Scott, ed., Oxford Press 1921) 
(reproduced in small print on fifteen large pages) (Second Meeting of Fourth Commission, 
June 28, 1907).  By abolishing raiding of enemy commerce on the high seas, Choate 
argued, “fleets will be left to their proper duty of maintaining blockades.” Id. at 763. But 
as a British delegate later warned, the “abolition of the right of capture necessarily 
involves the abolition of commercial blockade. For the object of both measures is to 
hamper the commercial activities of the enemy and to deprive him, so far as possible, of 
the supplies which are indispensable to this economic life.” Id. at 822 (Fourth Commission, 
July 17). Choate had been a successful trial attorney before entering the U.S. Senate as 
Daniel Webster’s successor.  Mark Twain said Choate’s head “was full of history and 
some of it was true, too.”  A leading history of the conference notes that if he had heard 
this speech, Twain “would have been convinced he had told the truth about Choate.”  
CALVIN DAVIS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE 228 (Duke 
Univ. Press 1975). 
 240.  Id. at 828 (Seventh Meeting of Fourth Commission, July 19, 1907). 
 241.  Id. (13 delegations supported the Brazilian proposal, while 12 joined the 
United States in opposition). 
 242.  Id. at 829. 
 243.  Id. (text of Belgian proposal at 1125). 
 244.  Hague Convention (XI) Relative to Certain Restrictions with regard to the 
Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War, signed 18 Oct. 1907, reprinted in THE 
LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 1087–91. 
 245.  Hague Convention (XII) Relative to the Creation of An International Prize 
Court, signed 18 Oct. 1907, in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 1093–
1104. 
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negotiated in 1909, sought to clarify limits that the international court 
would apply.246  The United States Senate insisted that it would violate 
the U.S. Constitution to allow appeals from the Supreme Court to an 
international tribunal.247 Even without such constitutional arguments to 
fall back on, critics in Britain’s House of Lords questioned the logic of 
submitting disputes to a tribunal in which small states with no naval 
power could send judges to vote on issues of special concern to great 
naval powers.248 Britain’s House of Lords ultimately rejected  the 
Declaration.249 Given the objections of major naval powers, both efforts 
to clarify new standards remained in limbo. 
In the ensuing war, most earlier notions of restraint were repudiated 
by the belligerent powers. By 1917, Britain had extended its wartime 
blockade of Germany to include almost all food and almost all other 
civilian goods.250 To ensure that the blockade was effective, Britain 
extended it to neutral ports in Europe to ensure that goods destined for 
Germany would not be unloaded elsewhere and shipped by land to 
Germany.251  Controls were so comprehensive that neutrals agreed to 
accept British supervision of cargoes and proposed routes at ports of 
embarkation (notably in the Western Hemisphere) so that ships would 
not be subject to inspection by British naval patrols on the high seas.252 
 
 246.  Declaration Concerning Laws of Naval War, signed at London, 26 Feb. 1909, 
reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 1113–22.  For background 
on the London conference and its aftermath, see DAVIS, SECOND HAGUE CONFERENCE, 
supra note 239, at 303–26. 
 247.  Id.  
 248.  Statement of the Earl of Selborne, DEBATES IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT, 
1911-1912, ON THE DECLARATION OF LONDON AND THE NAVAL PRIZE BILL 634 (1919) 
(“The great question involved for us in each of these [disputes about the meaning of the 
Declaration], the principle involved, might be settled contrary to what we believe the 
true interpretation of international law in this prize court by the casting vote, in the first 
year, of Colombia or Bolivia, in the second year of Uruguay or Costa Rica, and in the 
third year of Venezuela or Haiti.  That is not a joke but a perfectly true statement of what 
is possible under the bill.”). 
 249.  Id.  
 250.  For a summary of the gradual tightening of Allied blockade measures, see 
DAVID STEVENSON, CATACLYSM: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AS POLITICAL TRAGEDY 200–03 
(Basic 2004). For an extremely detailed history, see A.C. BELL, A HISTORY OF THE BLOCKADE 
OF GERMANY 221–46 (1961). 
 251.  Id. 
 252.  For detailed account of the permit system, see generally HUGH RITCHIE, THE 
“NAVICERT” SYSTEM DURING THE WORLD WAR (Carnegie, 1938). 
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The United States protested some of the Allied blockade measures in 
the early years of the war.253 After the United States entered the war in 
April 1917, the U.S. Navy was assigned to enforce those measures. 
Woodrow Wilson insisted on closing loopholes still left under  the 
accumulated patchwork of British shipping restrictions,  blocking all 
exports from the United States to Germany.254 
German passenger ships, from the civilian-owned Hamburg-America 
line, had taken refuge in U.S. ports during the period of  American 
neutrality. When the United States entered the war, the U.S. government 
seized those ships.255 Nearly half of the American troops brought to 
France in 1918 were transported on those ships.256 The United States did 
not return them at war’s end.  Nor did the United States ever provide 
compensation to the original German owners.257 
VI.  GERMANY’S SPECIAL WAY 
As the preceding section shows, the United States, along with Britain, 
embraced a more hard-edged view of war than that advocated by German 
legal commentators in the Nineteenth Century. Yet, German military 
commanders, down to the First World War, deployed much more brutal 
methods in land warfare. It might seem, then, that all great powers simply 
adjusted their ideals to the hard challenges faced in actual war. 
That is not, however, how Anglo-American commentators saw things 
at the time. Well before the First World War, English and American 
observers expressed uneasiness about the strident militarism of the new 
Germany.258 Anglo-American legal commentators expressed particular 
 
 253.  See generally STEVENSON, supra note 250. 
 254.  See C. PAUL VINCENT, THE POLITICS OF HUNGER, THE ALLIED BLOCKADE OF 
GERMANY, 1915-1919 48 (Ohio Univ. Press, 1985). 
 255.  PAUL HALPERN, A NAVAL HISTORY OF WORLD WAR I 435 (Naval Institute Press 
1994). 
 256.  Id.  
 257.  See 2 C.C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND 
APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES, §§ 621–22, at 237–41 (LITTLE, BROWN 1922). Hyde 
questioned whether wholesale confiscation of enemy private property was still consistent 
with international law in the Twentieth Century, but noted that Germany waived any 
claims for recovery in post-war peace treaties. Id. § 765, at 523–24. 
 258.  See JEFF LIPKES, REHEARSALS, THE GERMAN ARMY IN BELGUIM, AUGUST 
1914, at 563, 564 (Leuven Univ. Press 2007) (reviewing expressions of unease by 
English and American visitors before the world war at prevailing stridency, belligerence 
and hyper-nationalism in German culture, both at universities and in ordinary life).  Such 
analyses received more prominence after the outbreak of the war.   See, e.g., W.W. 
Willoughby, The Prussian Theory of the State, 12 AM. J. INT’L L. 251 (1918) (asserting 
that “the real and efficient cause of the war” for Britain and America was “German 
political ideals and standards of conduct” which “render impossible a comity of life and 
reciprocal friendliness and cooperation among the nations of the world.”). 
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concern about the implications of German writings on the law of war. In 
the midst of the First World War, a prominent legal commentator in 
England—who had translated Germany’s military manual into English—
described the organizers of the German military as “intellectual savages” 
who “had studied the dress and deportment of polite society but all the 
while nurture dark atavisms and murderous impulses in the center of 
[their] brain.”259 
Yet these later doctrines, as some commentators in the English-speaking 
world recognized, had roots in the more general theories of Bluntschli 
and his colleagues.260 The Nineteenth Century debate about naval war 
tactics had echoes in later debates about permissible tactics in land 
warfare.261 In these later debates, the Anglo-American commentators 
insisted that German doctrines had lost all touch with a common 
humanity.262 Anglo-American commentators could urge restraints in 
land warfare not in spite of, but precisely because they rejected the German 
view that war is solely a relation between states.263 
The political and moral atmosphere of Wilhelmine Germany reflected 
intellectual trends already quite evident in Bismarck’s time. Looking back, 
one can see the continuity even with Bluntschli’s work.  Before he wrote 
his treatise on international law, Bluntschli established his reputation with a 
 
 259.  See JOHN HARTMAN MORGAN, GERMAN ATROCITIES: AN OFFICIAL INVESTIGATION 
45–46 (DUTTON, 1916). Morgan (1876–1955) was neither a tabloid journalist, nor a 
crude jingoist, but a graduate of Balliol College, Oxford who had earned an advanced 
degree from the University of Berlin before the Great War. He wrote editorials for the 
Liberal Manchester Guardian and was a Liberal candidate for Parliament in 1910. Id.  
Trained as a lawyer, he served as military legal advisor at the Versailles Peace conference and 
in a variety of international legal advisory roles, culminating in an advisory role at the 
Nuremberg trials after World War II. Between the wars, he was professor of constitutional 
law at the University of London.  For overview of Morgan’s career, see the entry in 
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY (Oxford Press, 2004). 
 260.  See infra notes 283–91 and accompanying text  
 261.  Id. See also PIERCY BORDWELL, THE LAW OF WAR BETWEEN BELLIGERENTS 
(Chicago, 1908), criticizing doctrine associated with “Rousseau” as contradicted by “the 
practice of attacking maritime commerce” in war—and by “the rightfulness” of 
Sherman’s Georgia campaign in the Civil War (at 3, 4)—and then, immediately afterwards, 
criticizing German military doctrine “which would usurp the place of the laws of war 
altogether” (at 5).   
 262.  See infra notes 302–07, 316–19 and accompanying text  
 263.  See supra note 157, and infra notes 399–406 and accompanying texts and 
references. 
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book on the theory of the state.264  It is a long, tangled skein of history 
and philosophy.265 It dabbles in the racial science of the day, distinguishing 
the “Aryan” from the “Semitic” races, emphasizing the special gift for 
government among the former and the political incapacity of the latter.266 
Bluntschili’s treatise on “the state” rejects the classical liberal view that 
the state exists to protect the rights of citizens. The state, Bluntschli insists, 
has a much higher calling; that is, to ensure the “perfection” of the nation, 
considered as something apart from its individual members.267  In this, too, 
Bluntschli was a follower of Rousseau (or of German thinkers influenced 
by Rousseau’s revolt against classical liberalism).268 
Unlike Rousseau, Bluntschli defended monarchy, disparaging 
constitutional arrangements making the monarch dependent on his 
ministers since that “must lead to the abandonment of monarchy and the 
introduction of a republic.”269 At any rate, the pattern of monarchy “varies 
according to national character,” so it is a mistake to “derive the conception” 
of monarchy “from the English constitution alone.”270 With Rousseau, 
Bluntschli denied there could be any means to enforce constitutional 
limits on the state:  “it is impossible to establish within the State a tribunal 
before which the nation itself, as a whole, or its representative entrusted 
with supreme power, can be brought to account.”271 
When writers like Bluntschli emphasized that war is a relation between 
states, therefore, they did not mean to deprecate the claims of the state. 
 
 264.  JOHANN CASPAR BLUNTSCHLI, THE THEORY OF THE STATE (Oxford Clarendon 
Press, 1885) (English translation from Sixth German edition, LEHRE VOM MODERNENSTAAT,). 
None of Bluntschli’s work on international law was translated into English. 
 265.  See generally id.   
 266.  See id. at 80–81 (“. . . the Aryan family of nations . . . hold the first place in 
the history of states and the development of rights . . . On this rests the claim of the Aryan 
nations of Europe to become . . . the political leaders of the other nations of the earth and 
so to perfect the organization of mankind . . . Science has too long neglected the important 
bearing of race on law and morality.”). Speculations about the political implications of 
race were not confined to Germany in the Nineteenth Century, but no prominent 
commentator on international law, either in England or America, displayed  any 
comparable interest in racial science.  
 267.  See id. at 300 (“[A]ll these objections [to narrower definitions of the state’s 
purpose] are avoided if we formulate the proper and direct end of the State as the 
development of the national capacities, the perfecting of the national life, and finally its 
completion . . .”) (original emphasis).  Bluntschli goes on to contrast “free legal states” in 
which “the chief function is considered to be the development of the legal guarantees for 
national and individual freedom . . . as notably the Swiss cantons and the States of North 
America” with “national states” in which “the consciousness of nationality gives the 
chief impulse to public life, when manifestation of national unity seems to be the chief 
end of the state,” exemplified “in our own day” by “the German Empire.” Id. at 303–04. 
 268.  See infra note 405. 
 269.  THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 264, at 401. 
 270.  Id. at 409. 
 271.  Id. at 478. 
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The most immediate implication is that war is reserved for the state. If 
war is only a relation between states, then civilians seem to have no 
legitimate claim to participate. That is certainly how German military 
commanders understood the doctrine. 
In 1870, when the Prussian army defeated the regular armies of France, 
Prussian commanders were outraged to encounter hastily mobilized 
irregular forces. The Prussians denounced them as franc tireurs—civilian 
snipers.272 Field Marshal Moltke insisted that war must be confined to 
opposing armies; war between “whole nations” was a return to 
“barbarism.”273 When the city of Paris refused to capitulate to the advancing 
German army, even after the head of the French state at the time, Emperor 
Napoleon III, had personally surrendered to the Prussian army, there was 
fury at Prussian headquarters. The King of Prussia seemed to forget his 
initial proclamation that he was not making war on the French people.274 
He insisted that the army bombard the citizens of Paris until they 
surrendered, while also cutting off their food supply.275  Bluntschli’s 
 
 272.  GEOFFREY WAWRO, THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR 238 (Cambridge Univ. Press 
2003) (“Worried German mothers demanded that their conscript sons be shielded against 
‘evil people wielding knives, bombs and poison.’  Deeming franc-tireurs criminals and not 
soldiers, the Germans dealt harshly with every incident.”).  
 273.  Id. at 309 (When a Prussian patrol took fire from [the village of] Hericourt, an 
uhlan [cavalry] squadron charged into the village and burned it to the ground.” Though 
snipers inflicted “fewer than 1,000 casualties on German forces and fought badly,” in 
later years, commanders in that war “propounded the view that the Franktireurkrieg [war 
with civilian snipers] had been a waking nightmare of murder, mutilation and mayhem, 
and would have to be pitilessly dealt with in future wars.”).  See also ROGER CHICKERING, 
GREAT WAR, TOTAL WAR: COMBAT AND MOBILIZATION ON THE WESTERN FRONT, 1914-
1918, at 164 (2000). 
 274.  Stig Förster, The Prussian Triangle of Leadership in the Face of a People’s 
War: A Reassessment of the Conflict Between Bismarck and Moltke, 1870-71, in ON THE 
ROAD TO TOTAL WAR 115, 129–33 (Stig Förster & Jörg Nagler eds., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1997). 
 275.  Having organized a siege, Moltke was content to let Paris surrender when it 
ran out of food. Prime Minister Bismarck was anxious for quick results lest a prolonged 
war risk outside intervention. It was Bismarck who persuaded King Wilhelm to resort to 
bombardment. One of his trump cards was to present the advice of an American military 
observer with the Prussian army—General Philip Sheridan, who assured Bismarck that 
the Union army had resorted to shelling in similar situations, as at the siege of Vicksburg, less 
than eight years earlier. Also worth noting, however, is that Prussian guns ignored weapons 
factories to focus on historic districts on the Left Bank of Paris:  “Civilians were not 
being caught up in siege operations owing to the carelessness of the soldiers:  They were 
the ultimate target of those operations, which had no other aim but to intimidate them 
into political surrender.” Robert Tombs, The Wars against Paris 546–48, supra note 63. 
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treatise on international law passed over these episodes in silence, as if 
they were unworthy of notice. 
At the Brussels conference in 1874, the German delegation urged a 
provision that would have prohibited all civilian involvement in fighting.276  
Delegates from Belgium, the Netherlands and other small  countries 
protested, arguing that civilians must have the right to defend their country 
in time of invasion.277 The resulting text acknowledged the right of an 
occupying power to “take all the measures in his power to restore and 
ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety,” but left unsettled the 
question of when “occupation”—as opposed to ongoing conflict—should 
be recognized.278 The British government refused to endorse proposals 
to translate the Brussels text into a formal treaty, since the conference 
had demonstrated “that the interests of the invader and the invaded are 
irreconcilable.”279 Formally embracing the compromise would open the 
way for invaders to take extreme measures and that would “facilitate 
aggressive wars and paralyse the patriotic resistance of an invaded 
people.”280 
A quarter century later, at the first Hague Peace Conference, Britain 
and smaller states agreed on slightly modified language, but the German 
delegates were still unsatisfied. Germany would accept prisoner of war 
protections for members of militias fighting in uniform and under military 
discipline, but it rejected any other protective gestures toward civilian 
resistance.281  At the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907, the German 
delegation tried again to secure a provision in the Convention on Land 
Warfare that would limit the right of civilian resistance to an invader. 
Again, Germany failed to persuade other states to endorse its view.282 
English commentators saw the connection with the larger debate about 
the meaning of war. W.E. Hall raised the point in his 1880 treatise to 
 
 276.  HALL, supra note 85, at 618; see generally BEST, supra note 20. 
 277.  Id. 
 278.  Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of 
War, art. 2, Aug. 27, 1874 printed in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 
23–28. The preceding provision defined “occupation” as extending only to territory 
“actually placed under the authority of the hostile army . . . where such authority has 
been established and can be exercised,” without further defining any of these ambiguous 
terms.   
 279.  See Letter from the Earl of Derby, supra note 99. 
 279.  Id. 
 280.  Id.  
 281.  Col. Von Schwarzhoff agreed that civilians, in territory not yet occupied, 
might fight against an invader if already in an organized militia:  “At this point, however, 
my concessions cease; it is absolutely impossible for me to go one step further and 
follow those who declare for an absolutely unlimited right of defense.” JAMES B. SCOTT, 
THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, CONFERENCE OF 1907, at 420 (1921). 
 282.  DAVIS, SECOND HAGUE CONFERENCE 203–04, supra note 239. 
RABKIN (DO NOT DELETE) 10/12/2016  4:19 PM 
[VOL. 16:  1, 2014]  Anglo-American Dissent 
  SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 
 45 
underscore his rejection of the claim that war is only a relation between 
states. “If [civilians] are not enemies, they have no right of resistance to 
an invader; the spontaneous rising of a population becomes a crime; and 
the individual is a criminal who takes up arms without being formally 
enrolled in the regular armed forces of his state.”283  Hall acknowledged that 
an invading army could adopt severe measures to suppress civilian 
resistance, but imposing repressive measures “for reasons of convenience,” 
he insisted, was “wholly distinct” from propounding a doctrine that would 
“inflict a stain of criminality” on civilian heroes.284 
Westlake, writing in 1894, adopted the same view. The doctrine adopted 
by German commentators, he complained, “brands as criminal [the] acts 
done by the invaded population or by individual members of it which are 
only deserving of praise as patriotic.”285 Westlake also acknowledged 
that an invading army was entitled to use force against civilians who 
resisted it.286 Still, he insisted, “humanity would be better respected if the 
necessary repression is exercised with a regretful consciousness of the 
interest in which that is done, than if the invader tries to cover his interest by 
the pharisaical assumption that he is punishing guilt.”287 
The German army put the opposite theory into effect in its colony in 
Southwest Africa where it faced a native revolt in 1904. It burned villages 
and massacred natives on such a scale that the venture was later described 
as “genocide.”288 Nearly 80,000 people of the Herero tribe, somewhere 
between half or three-quarters of the population—very much including 
women and children—were killed.289  In the aftermath, the military 
commander on the scene told the surviving Hereros that they must leave 
the German colony or suffer the fate of their slaughtered tribesmen.290 
 
 283.  HALL, supra note 85, at 90–91 (citing, as an example, the Spanish guerrillas 
who resisted the French army in the Napoleonic wars).   
 284.  Id.  
 285.  COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 91, at 268–69.  
 286.  Id. 
 287.  Id. 
 288.  Three recent books state this claim.  JEREMY SARKIN, GERMANY’S GENOCIDE 
OF THE HERERO: KAISER WILHEIM II, HIS GENERAL, HIS SETLERS, HIS SOLDIERS (2011); 
CASPER ERCHSEN & DAVID OLUSOGA, THE KAISER’S HOLOCAUST: GERMANY’S FORGOTTEN 
GENOCIDE AND THE COLONIAL ROOTS OF NAZISM (Faber & Faber 2010); JURGEN ZIMMERER & 
JOACHIM ZELLER, GENOCIDE IN GERMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA: THE COLONIAL WAR 
(1904-1908) IN NAMIBIA AND ITS AFTERMATH (Edward Neather trans., Merlin Press 2008). 
 289.  ISABEL HULL, ABSOLUTE DESTRUCTION: MILITARY CULTURE AND THE PRACTICES 
OF WAR IN IMPERIAL GERMANY 88 (Cornell Univ. Press 2005). 
 290.  Id. 
RABKIN (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE) 10/12/2016  4:19 PM 
 
46 
Contemporary historians see the episode as reflecting a “military culture” 
already developing in the Nineteenth Century, which revealed its full 
sinister potential in the European wars of the Twentieth Century.291 
Colonial wars had always been fought with more permissive rules, but 
the German army was more brutal than its European counterparts in 
Africa.292  It was again more brutal in the 1901 international campaign to 
repress the Boxer Rebellion in China.293  Europeans took notice when, in 
1914, German commanders implemented their military doctrines against 
civilians in Belgium and France. In the first weeks of the war, the American 
ambassador in England, after talking with American and neutral observers 
in Belgium, cabled the State Department that the German army there had 
perpetrated “some of the most barbarous acts in human annals.”294 
As the German army entered Belgium, inexperienced troops seemed 
to have mistaken stray shots from fellow troopers for a Belgian civilian 
rising. Commanders on the scene reacted with startling ferocity.295 As 
Hall and Westlake had warned decades earlier, the German legal doctrine 
on war prompted commanders to see civilian resistance as expressions of 
 
 291.  Id. at 5–90.  Though the book covers activities of the German military down 
to the end of the First World War, the dust jacket features a photograph of a soldier from 
the campaign in South-West Africa.  
 292.  For detailed accounts of tactics in such wars, see CHARLES EDWARD CALLWELL, 
SMALL WARS, THEIR PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 40–42 (Univ. Nebraska Press 1990 reprint of 
3d. ed., 1906;, original edition, 1890) (recommending “raids on livestock” to quell native 
rebellions outside Europe, or else “their villages must be demolished and their crops and 
granaries destroyed” and remembering that “the overawing and not the exasperation of 
the enemy is the end to keep in view.” ).  
 293.  Germany participated with five other nations (Russia, Japan, France, Britain, 
the United States) in a relief expedition to Peking, to rescue besieged western diplomats 
there. The episode left one enduring legacy on English terminology, after Kaiser Wilhelm 
admonished his troops to show no mercy to the Chinese and prove themselves “Huns of 
the Twentieth Century.”  The German forces did behave with exceptional brutality, according 
to a recent study,  “The notion that [Chinese] atrocities ought to  be atoned for by 
counter-atrocities [committed by European armies against the Chinese] did not find 
general approval [among European military commanders]. The German case was unique 
in its extreme obsession with prestige.” Sabine Dabringhaus, An Army on Vacation? The 
German War in China, 1900-1901, in ANTICIPATING TOTAL WAR: THE GERMAN AND 
AMERICAN EXPERIENCES, 1871-1914, at 459, 468–73 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1999).   
 294.  Telegram from the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of 
State (Sept. 11, 1914), in PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED 
STATES: 1914 SUPPLEMENT THE WORLD WAR 795, 795 (1928). He cites accounts of “young 
girls violated by German soldiers,” of “Belgian boys” who had “the tendons” in their 
“arms and legs cut with swords,” of English soldiers “whose noses were cut off while 
they lay wounded on the field.” Id. 
 295.  JOHN HORNE & ALAN KRAMER, GERMAN ATROCITIES, 1914, at 15–18 (Yale 
Univ. Press 2001).  
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criminality, banditry—“infamy”—in the repression of which “human lives 
cannot be spared.”296 
In the first two weeks of the war, some 20,000 buildings were destroyed; 
not as collateral damage from attacks on military objectives, but by 
deliberate purpose to punish civilians for engaging in sniper attacks.297  
In the same period, some 6,000 civilians were shot; not by accident in 
the midst of fighting, but again as deliberate policy to repress “franc 
tireurs.”298 Not even German commanders claimed that the civilians 
executed were those who had actually engaged in sniper attacks. Some 
had been in custody at the time of the alleged attacks.299  As it happens, 
subsequent research—including that by German scholars—indicates that 
there were probably no sniper attacks at all.300  However, the response 
was so ferocious that it was later recalled with relish by Hitler when he 
talked about necessary measures to repress partisan resistance in Russia 
during his war.301 
At the time, German reprisals against civilians in Belgium provoked 
outrage in western countries, where it was seen as a symptom of 
unrestrained “militarism.”302  Decades earlier, before the passions stirred 
by the actual events of the Great War, English commentators had noticed 
another disturbing aspect of German military doctrine.  In the 1880s, one 
of the leading German commentators on the law of war, Carl Lueder, had 
argued that “great and inhuman offenses against international law” might 
 
 296.  A year after the outbreak of the war, General von Bissing explained the policy to a 
German audience:  “In the repression of infamy, human lives cannot be spared and if . . . 
entire towns are annihilated, that is regrettable but it must not excite ill-timed sentimentality.  
All this must not in our eyes weigh as much as the life of a single one of our brave 
soldiers.  The rigorous accomplishment of duty is the emanation of a high Kultur, and in 
that, the population of the enemy country can learn a lesson from our army.” The speech 
was originally reported in a German newspaper (Kolnische Zeitung, Sept. 8, 1914) and 
evidently did no harm to Bissing’s reputation:  he was soon after appointed Governor-
General of Belgium. James W. Garner, The German War Code, 15 U. ILL. BULLETIN 9 
(1918).  Resistance to German occupation was classified by German authorities as the 
crime of “war treason.” 
 297.  John Horne & Alan Kramer, War Between Soldiers and Enemy Civilians, in 
GREAT WAR, TOTAL WAR: COMBAT AND MOBILIZATION OF THE WESTERN FRONT, 1914-
1918, at 153, 157 (Roger Chickering & Stig Forster eds., 2000). 
 298.  Id. 
 299.  HORNE & KRAMER, supra note 295, at 18. 
 300.  Id. at 15. 
 301.  Id. at 168. 
 302.  ALAN KRAMER, DYNAMIC OF DESTRUCTION: CULTURE AND MASS KILLING IN 
THE FIRST WORLD WAR 14–19 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007). 
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be “justified . . . in cases of real necessity.”303 John Westlake thought the 
doctrine was going far beyond any reasonable claim. 
As Westlake noted, Lueder expressly endorsed the Bluntschli doctrine 
that war is solely a relation between states.304 Here, that premise was 
stretched to the conclusion that the state’s aims must take priority over 
every competing concern of humanity, such that winning more quickly 
could justify almost any abuse. Still, the aim of having all wars “decided 
by the first year or the first campaign” could not, in Westlake’s view, justify 
a claim of necessity. That approach would simply favor those most inclined 
to war:  “The most aggressive states and therefore those the least entitled to 
succeed would generally be the best prepared and therefore the likeliest 
to succeed.”305 
Still, in the 1890s, Westlake regarded the whole debate as somewhat 
academic when he said, “It is not to be greatly feared that Prof. Lueder’s 
own government will ever give effect to his doctrine by ordering the 
devastation of a whole region as an act of terrorism.”306  In a slightly 
different context, Westlake noted that even a “crime against the world” 
would be tolerated by “opinion” in outside countries. He offered the 
example of Union forces in the American civil war “destroying a harbor” to 
ensure it could not be used—“if there has been no great suffering by 
individuals to excite pity.”307  To Westlake, who still saw international 
law as reflecting deeper principles of “natural justice,” it seemed obvious 
that calling all the members of an opposing society “the enemy” did not 
mean that they forfeited all claims as human beings. 
What he failed to consider was that the German army was not under 
reliable civilian control. The German Reich had a legislature elected by 
universal suffrage, but the chancellor and other ministers served at the 
pleasure of the Kaiser, not the Reichstag.308 Even in Bismarck’s time, 
the military insisted on its own approach, answerable to the Kaiser but 
not to civilian leaders.309  Field Marshall Moltke, hero of the war of 1870, 
wrote to Professor Bluntschli in 1880, criticizing proposals for  more 
humanitarian restraints in war. Moltke even condemned the 1868 St. 
 
 303.  Lueder’s essay on the law of war appeared in FRANZ VON HOLTZENDORFF, 
HANDBUCH DER VÖLKERRECHTS 484 (1885). Westlake quotes it at some length (in 
English translation) COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 91, at 246.  
 304.  COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 91, at 268.  
 305.  Id. at 272. 
 306.  Id. at 247. 
 307.  Id. at 279. 
 308.  GORDON CRAIG, THE POLITICS OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY 217–55 (Oxford Univ. 
Press 1956). 
 309.  Id. 
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Petersburg Declaration that prohibited explosive bullets in war, despite 
the German government’s official endorsement.310 
After the first Hague Peace Conference agreed on a convention regulating 
the “law and custom of war on land” in 1899, the British, French, and 
American armies distributed the text of the Hague rules to officers and 
incorporated them into their national military manuals.311  After all, the 
Convention stipulated that signatory states “issue instructions to their 
armed land forces . . . in conformity” with the Hague rules.312 In Britain, 
France and the United States, new manuals tried to conform to requirements 
in the Hague rules.313 The German military took a different course. Instead 
of distributing the Hague rules, Germany’s Ministry of War distributed a 
manual, in 1902, claiming that efforts to codify warfare had “completely 
failed” and warning officers to be on guard against excessive 
humanitarian tendencies. It read, “[S]ince the tendency of thought of the 
last century was dominated essentially by humanitarian considerations, 
which not infrequently degenerated into sentimentality and flabby emotion, 
there have not been wanting attempts to influence the development of 
the usages of war in a way which was in fundamental contradiction with the 
nature of war and its object.”314 
Among other things, the German manual dismissed Hague provisions 
on the treatment of civilian armed resistance as mere “moral recognition” 
not binding on the German army.315 Instead, it urged officers to prepare 
for extreme measures against civilian resistance. The manual openly praised 
“resort to terrorism” as well as the taking and shooting of c ivilian 
 
 310.  Comte de Moltke, Letter from M. le comte de Moltke to M. Bluntschli, 13 
REVUE DE DROIT INT’L 80, 80–82 (1881) (criticizing the St. Petersburg Declaration for 
demanding that war measures focus solely on weakening the armed forces of the enemy).  
Moltke insisted that it was necessary to attack the “finances, railroads, provisions, even 
the prestige” with “all the resources of the enemy government.” Id. at 81. He emphasized 
the remaining limitation by remarking, immediately afterwards, that the war with France 
in 1870 had been prolonged far beyond the initial clash of armies by the resistance of 
revolutionary forces. Id. 
 311.  HULL, supra note 289, at 128; Garner, German War Code, supra note 296, at 
3, 4 (1918).  
 312.  Hague Convention IV, supra note 19, art. 1. 
 313.  See Garner, German War Code, supra note 296, at 4, 11, 16, 19, 21, 23, 26–27.  
 314.  WAR BOOK OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 5 (J. H. Morgan trans., Stackpole 
Books, 2005, reprint of 1915 Morgan translation) [hereinafter WAR BOOK]. 
 315.  Id. at 5 (equating formal Hague treaty with the Brussels Declaration); id. at 14 
(criticizing both Brussels and Hague provisions as inadequate from German viewpoint). 
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hostages.316 And yet the manual embraced the traditional German view— 
which it described as “today the universally prevalent view”—that 
“inhabitants of the enemy’s territory are no longer to be regarded, generally 
speaking, as enemies.”317 It gave respectful notice to opinions of Professor 
Bluntschli318 and even praised Benjamin Franklin (along with Frederick 
the Great) for the same 1785 treaty that so impressed Red Cross 
commentators.319 The writers of the manual give little indication that 
they conceive themselves to have made a sharp break with earlier German 
doctrines on the nature of war. 
Contemporary historians see the German military’s “antipathy to civilian 
engagement in combat” as reflecting “a conservative suspicion of any 
blurring of the demarcation between military and civilian sphere and 
especially of democratic and revolutionary politics that sought to do 
this.”320 It also reflected the notion that everything must be subordinated 
to military aims and military aims subordinated to some ill-defined notion 
of “victory” for “the state.”321 German military doctrine stressed the 
importance of achieving an “annihilating blow” against the enemy  
as quickly as possible.322 
In 1914, the German army had insisted on launching its attack on France 
by way of neutral Belgium, thereby provoking Britain’s entry into the 
war.323  In 1917, the army insisted on a return to unrestricted-submarine 
warfare, even though civilian leaders warned that it would provoke 
American entry into the war.324 As late as the spring of 1918, army leaders 
insisted on throwing all of Germany’s remaining military strength into 
one last great offensive on the Western Front, which was supposed to enable 
 
 316.  Id. at 89 (praising Napoleon and Wellington for “resort to terrorism” to quell 
popular risings—with no specifics or citations). Garner, German War Code, supra note 
296, compares the German manual on the laws of war with counterparts of British, French 
and American armies, stressing unique German embrace of “terrorism”—including the 
shooting of hostages—and other extreme measures, sanctioned by no western manual, 
along with unique German doctrines regarding “necessity.”  
 317.  WAR BOOK, supra note 314, at 78.  
 318.  Id. at 43–44, nn.22, 26. The Manual also cites the same proclamation of 
Prussia’s king at the outset of the war of 1870, which so impressed Bluntschli—and the 
authors of the Red Cross Commentary 94, supra note 12. 
 319.  Id. at 21. 
 320.  Horne & Kramer, supra note 297, at 153, 167. 
 321.  See generally HULL, supra note 289, at 107–09. 
 322.  Id. at 166–67. Schlieffen Plan rested on “vernichtungsgedanke,” the idea 
of complete annihilation of the enemy force. See also CRAIG, supra note 308, at 278–83.  
 323.  STEVENSON, supra note 250, at 256–60 (on military plans to invade Belgium); 
JOHN KEEGAN, THE FIRST WORLD WAR 29–36 (Knopf, 1999) (invasion through Belgium).  
 324.  STEVENSON, supra note 250, at 318–20 (decision to resume unrestricted U-boat 
attacks); KEEGAN, supra note 323, at 318–20 (resumption of U-boat attacks).  
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Germany at long last to dictate the terms of peace.325 That decision 
forfeited the last solid chance to negotiate a compromise peace, as urged 
by President Wilson in January 1918, and then left Germany unable to 
resist terms imposed by the victorious Allies after the Armistice that 
fall.326 
Germany paid a very high price for treating the military as something 
entirely above and apart from the society that sustained it. Granted, that 
approach was, at some level, an entirely logical application of the 
Bluntschli doctrine that war is an exclusive concern of the state and its 
armed forces. 
There was a comparable heedlessness toward humanitarian limits in 
the conduct of the war. In the course of the war, German commanders 
conscripted over a hundred thousand Belgian civilians to forced labor. 
Over 50,000 Belgians were forced to work in factories in Germany in 
what the American ambassador to Germany protested as “virtual slavery.”327 
Thousands of these workers died.328 Belgium became not just an occupied 
territory, but a conquered preserve that could be exploited without limit 
in the service of German war aims. Germany built a fence on the border 
between occupied Belgium and neutral Netherlands to keep Belgian 
civilians from escaping and thereby evading forced labor requisitions.329 
In occupied territories in Eastern Europe, the German army resorted to 
even more extreme brutality than in Belgium, conscripting hundreds of 
thousands to forced labor.330  By the end of the war, a retreating German 
army in the West engaged in “pillage and destruction without any military 
purpose.”331 Germany’s ally, Turkey, insisted on removing Armenian 
Christians from the conflict zone with Russia, causing over a million deaths 
in what Armenians still insist was a “genocide.”332 German military 
advisors were on the scene. Far from restraining their all ies, they 
encouraged them to be ruthless in the name of “military necessity.”333 
 
 325.  STEVENSON, supra note 250, at 324–28 (military determination to gamble on 
last great offensive)  
 326.  KEEGAN, supra note 323, at 375–77, 392–94, 412–14 (1999) (last great offensive, 
spurned Wilson peace terms). 
 327.  KRAMER, supra note 302, at 45.  
 328.  Id.  
 329.  Id. at 42–43. 
 330.  Id.  
 331.  Id. at 47–50. 
 332.  HULL, supra note 289, at 263–90. 
 333.  Id. 
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The view that war is a relation between states not only encouraged 
extreme views of “necessity”—as anything advantageous to the state—
but it also reinforced the view that war is an activity for far higher ends 
than those that preoccupy ordinary citizens.  If the state is the guardian 
of culture, a war between states might well seem a contest of national 
cultures, a contest for supremacy between competing worldviews. That 
is certainly how leading German intellectuals saw the war. In an “Appeal 
to the Civilized World” published in October 1914, distinguished scholars 
and professors insisted that Germany was fighting for “kultur,” while the 
Allies were sullying Europe with “Negroes and Mongols” in their armies.334 
Even in the opening phase of the war, some German artists and writers 
embraced such a strange, ethno-nationalist view of “kultur” that 
they exulted in the willful destruction of French cathedrals.335 
The military policy did not reflect complete disdain for rules as much 
as for background appeals to “humanity.”336 Before the war was a year 
old, the Germans violated the prohibition in the Hague Declaration 
against the use of “asphyxiating gases.”337  The Foreign Ministry insisted 
 
 334.  “Appeal of 93 [Scholars] to the Civilized World,” denying claims of German 
atrocities as “poisonous weapons of lies from the hands of our enemies,” then concluding:  
“Those who have allied themselves with Russians and Serbs, and who present the world 
with the shameful spectacle of inciting Mongolians and Negroes against the white race, 
have the very least right to present themselves as defenders of European civilization . . . 
Believe that we shall fight this war to the end as a cultured people to whom the legacy of 
Goethe, Beethoven and Kant are as sacred as hearth and land.”  Only German cultural 
monuments seemed to register as evidence of “culture.”  Text of the “Appeal” is available 
from German History in Documents and Images at: http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/ 
sub_document.cfm?document_id=938. 
 335.  KRAMER, supra note 302, at 27–30 (Notes exultation of German writers and 
artists—not militarists in peacetime—at the destruction of the French cathedral in 
Rheims and other cultural treasures in France and Belgium:  “German intellectuals rejoicing 
in the destruction of cultural monuments was explicitly linked with their role as national 
signifiers.”  Almost from the outset, the war came to be seen by many Germans as a conflict 
of competing cultures, on the assumption that “the state” was the custodian of something 
much beyond the personal security of citizens.).  
 336. MORGAN, supra note 259 (“The subtle danger of the presence of such a nation 
[of ‘intellectual savages’] in the European comity is that it uses the language of that 
international society, and yet all the while means something different, and that with 
every appearance of solemn subscription to its forms and treaties it is making mental 
reservations and ‘economies’ which strike at the very root of them . . . . In the hands of 
such a nation an international convention in not merely idle and impotent; the convention 
itself becomes positively dangerous, simply because it can be perverted.  It can be used to 
invest the most barbarous acts with a specious plausibility, and can be turned against the 
very people whom it was designed to protect.”).  
 337.  Declaration Concerning Asphyxiating Gases, Signed 28 July 1899, text in THE 
LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 95–96 (pledging “to abstain from the use of 
projectiles, the sole purpose of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious 
gases.”).  The German reasoning is described in MODRIS EKSTEINS, RITES OF SPRING: THE 
GREAT WAR AND THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN AGE 161 (1989). 
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that German gas attacks had not violated international law because the 
Hague regulations technically referred to poison delivered in “weapons” 
and therefore did not cover gas released from self-contained canisters, 
not delivered by projectiles, but simply wafted by the wind.338 Military 
leaders were so eager for a weapon to break the stalemate in the trenches 
that they failed to consider that Britain and France could also deploy 
poison gas—and the prevailing winds favored the Allies.339 
German arguments about unrestricted U-boat attacks rested on a similar 
form of hyper-legalism. The German Foreign Office insisted that Britain 
and France had violated pre-war agreements regarding the permissible 
scope of blockades.340  Therefore, Germany was entitled to respond to 
unlawful Allied restrictions on shipping with extraordinary measures by 
way of reprisal.  Given British naval superiority in surface ships, Germany 
could only enforce its own counter measures with U-boat attacks.  As 
the Allies sought to block almost all shipping to German ports, Germany 
 
 338.  Id.  
 339.  Rolf-Dieter Mueller, Total War as a Result of New Weapons? The Use of 
Chemical Agents in World War I, in GREAT WAR, TOTAL WAR: COMBAT AND MOBILIZATION 
ON THE WESTERN FRONT, 1914-1918, at 95, 99–100 (Roger Chickering & Stig Forster 
eds., 2000). German production of chlorine gas, at its peak in October 1918, reached 
1,000 tons per month; Britain was then producing 3,000 tons, the U.S. preparing to 
produce 6,000 tons. WINSTON CHURCHILL, THE WORLD CRISIS 519–20 (1931) 
(acknowledging that British military planners had thought about the possibilities of 
“poisonous smoke” and were aware that prevailing winds favored attacks from west to 
east, but “noxious or poisonous fumes were explicitly prohibited by International Law).  
We could not therefore employ it ourselves unless and until the enemy himself began.” It 
is now known that Churchill pressed the army to consider use of chemical weapons to 
protect troops in the Normandy landings— and was talked out of it by top generals, who 
insisted it would not be worth the risks involved, diplomatic as well as tactical. RICHARD 
OVERY, THE BOMBERS AND THE BOMBED: ALLIED AIR WAR OVER EUROPE, 1940-1945, at 
198 (Penguin, 2014).  
 340.  At the very outset of war, Britain and France announced their willingness to 
abide by provisions of the 1910 Declaration of London, regarding definitions of contraband, 
though it had not been formally ratified or implemented. The subsequent escalation of 
provocations and reprisals, between German and Allied naval forces (and the foreign 
ministries), is a very complicated story, which took years to reach the “all-out” character 
it achieved by 1917. The most detailed account—which is hundreds of pages, with 
precise citations to relevant legal texts—is in A.C. BELL, A HISTORY OF THE BLOCKADE 
OF GERMANY (1937). For recent assessment of the blockade’s comportment with 
prevailing standards of international law, see ISABEL V. HULL, A SCRAP OF PAPER: BRAKING 
AND MAKING INTERNATIONAL LAW DURING THE GREAT WAR 183–210 (Cornell Univ. 
Press 2014) (concluding that, with some exceptions, measures taken could be defended 
under international law at the time and even today). 
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was entitled to block all shipping into British ports by threatening U-
boat attacks on any and all ships heading toward those ports.341 
There was something to this argument.  There was a crucial difference 
in the conduct of the two sides, however, from the perspective of neutrals 
and especially from the perspective of the most important neutral before 
1917, the United States. British blockade measures imposed serious burdens 
on American commerce—that is, business losses, but they could be offset 
by new opportunities to supply the vast needs of the Anglo-French war 
effort.342 The U-boat attacks imposed loss of life, which could not be offset. 
After the sinking of the passenger liner Lusitania in May of 1915, 
President Wilson warned Germany of “strict accountability” for the loss 
of American lives.  In practice, as a contemporary historian notes, the claim 
of “strict accountability” was “applied to American lives, not to American 
property.”343 
It is hard to get past the difference between seizing ships and sinking 
ships, the difference between diverting wartime trade, on the one hand, 
and condemning crews and passengers to drowning at sea, on the other. 
Sinking ships was bound “to excite pity,” in Westlake’s phrase.344  
Conventional blockade measures did not do that, at least to the same 
extent. That was the crux of the traditional British defense of naval war 
against enemy commerce: that it was, in practice, less destructive and 
inhumane than accepted practices in land warfare. To Germans, it looked 
different, especially as the blockade tightened and came to include 
restrictions on foodstuffs—hence viewed from Germany as “hunger 
blockade.”345 
As early as the spring of 1916, Kaiser Wilhelm dismissed concerns about 
submarines to the American ambassador and protested “the efforts to 
starve out Germany and keep out milk.”346  Less than two years into the 
 
 341.  PAUL HALPERN, A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 202, 296 (Naval 
Institute 1994). 
 342.  Id. at 291 (“Whereas British and French actions involved property and could 
be contested in prize courts, the German measures in the submarine war frequently 
involved loss of life . . . . The British and French therefore had a noted advantage in the 
propaganda war for the sympathy of the riches and most powerful neutral of them all, the 
United States.  The Germans—at least the naval authorities—however well grounded 
and legalistic their arguments, seemed never to fully comprehend this.”). 
 343.  C. PAUL VINCENT, THE POLITICS OF HUNGER: THE ALLIED BLOCKADE OF 
GERMANY, 1915-1919, at 43 (Ohio Univ. Press 1985). 
 344.  COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 91, at 279. 
 345.  VINCENT, supra note 343.  
 346.  JAMES W. GERARD, MY FOUR YEARS IN GERMANY 399–40 (G.H. Doran Co. 
1917). 
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war, the Kaiser concluded, “there was no longer any international law. 
To this last statement, the Chancellor [Bettman Hollweg] agreed.”347 
In the aftermath of the German defeat, German opinion embraced the 
notion that “war crimes” and “laws of war” were a “polemical invention 
of the victorious Allies.”348 In the early 1920s, a French army officer named 
Charles DeGaulle who had spent years as a prisoner of war in Germany, 
ascribed German defeat to “a lack of balance” and a penchant for extreme, 
self-glorying action among German officers, who were, he said, too much 
under the spell of Friedrich Nietzsche.349 Perhaps the roots of that outlook— 
in its disdain for the concerns of ordinary citizens in modern commercial 
societies—were much deeper.  By the early 1920s, a distinguished German 
scholar of religion observed that terms like “humanity” had become “almost 
incomprehensible” to a German audience.350 Barely a decade later, one 
of Germany’s leading legal theorists spelled out the implication: “Not 
every being with a human face is human.”351 
VII.  CONTINUITIES AND CONTEMPORARY IMPLICATIONS 
In the decades before the First World War, debate over the legal 
meaning of war centered on commerce raiding on the high seas. British 
commentators defended the seizure of private enemy property at sea, 
while most European commentators denounced the practice. The 
explanation might seem quite simple. Britain was the world’s dominant 
naval power in that era. The major European states, having invested their 
resources in building up massive land forces, could not compete at sea. 
 
 347.  Id.  
 348.  RICHARD J. EVANS, THE COMING OF THE THIRD REICH 65 (Penguin Books 2004). 
 349.  CHARLES DE GAULLE, THE ENEMY’S HOUSE DIVIDED 2–3, 16 (Robert Eden, 
trans., Univ. of N.C. Press ed. 2002) (DISCORD CHEZ L’ENEMIE, 1924). The American 
editor of this work quotes, in his introduction, an unpublished article by De Gaulle, 
which was composed around 1919 or 1920 and embraced the traditional Anglo-American 
view as common sense: “It is a commonplace to say that the war just ended—or that 
appears to have ended—was a war between peoples, and not merely a war between 
armies.” Id. at xxiii. 
 350.  Ernst Troeltsh, The Ideas of Natural Law and Humanity in World Politics, 
reprinted in OTTO GIERKE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOCIETY 1500 TO 1800, at 
202 app. (Ernest Barker trans., Beacon Press ed. 1957) (The “terms ‘Natural Law’ and 
‘Humanity’. . . have now become almost incomprehensible in Germany, and have lost 
altogether their original life and colour.”). 
 351.  Carl Schmitt, Das gute Recht der deutschen Revolution, reprinted in Josef 
Becker & Ruth Becker, HITLERS MACHTERGREIFUNG 301 (1983).  
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The United States might seem the exception that proves the rule. The 
U.S. was an early advocate for the European view regarding immunity 
of private property at sea, but American presidents insisted the United 
States would not waive its right to authorize privateers to seize enemy 
property at sea unless all navies embraced this limitation. Then, as it 
built up a sizable navy in the Civil War, the United States exercised  
unprecedented claims for blockade tactics.  Decades later, having rebuilt 
its navy, the United States favored only qualified restrictions on naval 
seizures, before finally embracing and helping to implement Britain’s 
all-encompassing naval blockade strategy in the First World War. 
From this perspective, the old debate might seem merely a particular 
instance of  a general pattern in international affairs. States resist doctrines 
that limit their own comparative advantage, just as they favor doctrines 
that restrain the relative advantages of their rivals. At the Geneva conference 
that drafted the text of AP I in the mid-1970s, an African delegate proposed 
the following rule for the deployment of air power in future conflicts: 
where one side has the capacity to engage in aerial attacks and the opposing 
side does not, all attacks from the air should be forbidden.352 
There was more to the historic debate on the legal characterization of 
war, however, than a contingent historical episode, more to it, one might 
say, than mere legal advocacy. As Anglo-American commentators pointed 
out, all leading treatises on international law before the Nineteenth Century 
held to the same view on the underlying doctrine: war is a contest between 
entire political communities, not simply between states and their armed 
forces.353 The traditional view had certainly embraced humanitarian 
constraints, emphasizing that, in most circumstances, lethal force should 
not be directed at unarmed “enemies” who in themselves  present no 
immediate lethal threat. That general rule, however, applied as much to 
surrendered combatants as to surrounding non-combatants.354 
It was not the traditional view that “civilians” must be protected from 
all harm in war, even as to property and material well-being. The term 
“civilian” does not appear in Eighteenth Century treatises, let alone in the 
works of earlier commentators.355  It does not appear at all in America’s 
Civil War Lieber Code nor in the humanitarian limitations set down in 
 
 352.  Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F.  L.  REV. 1, 79 (1990). 
 353.  See supra §§ IV, V. 
 354.  See VATTEL, supra note 111 at 282 (sparing women and children), § 149–50, at 
284 (captured enemy soldiers should not be “put to death” or treated “harshly”).  
 355.  The Oxford English Dictionary reports no use of “civilian” in the sense of 
non-military before the Eighteenth Century and no use of “civilian casualty” or “civilian 
target” before the Twentieth Century.  
RABKIN (DO NOT DELETE) 10/12/2016  4:19 PM 
[VOL. 16:  1, 2014]  Anglo-American Dissent 
  SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 
 57 
the Hague Regulations on land warfare in 1907.356 European commentators 
did not dispute that their favored doctrine was at variance with traditional 
views.  They simply argued, in the decades before the First World War, 
“the progress of humanity” had opened the way to broader protections 
based on wider ethical perspectives.357 
Yet the new doctrine did not prevail in the world wars of the Twentieth 
Century.  The First World War spawned a new term, “economic warfare,” 
summarizing the rationale for ever tightening blockade measures and 
accompanying financial controls on enemy commerce.358 Such measures 
struck at the whole German economy, hence the whole society. The 
blockade could hardly be conceived as applying only to “the state” and 
its armed forces. In the Second World War, British analysts characterized 
air attacks on German factories and then on workers housing as “industrial 
blockades,”359 hence an extension of earlier policies. The official history 
of the British bombing campaign characterized air attacks on German 
cities as the modern counterpart to attacks on merchant shipping in earlier 
naval wars.360 
Thus, the earlier debate remained relevant in later times. Learned and 
morally serious scholars defended even the more extreme Allied measures 
in the world wars, seeing them as applications of the traditional Anglo-
American approach to war.  Hersch Lauterpacht is a notable example. 
He edited Oppenheim’s treatise and ultimately succeeded Oppenheim as 
Whewell Professor of International Law at Cambridge.361  In an article 
published in 1952, Lauterpacht defended both the wartime blockade 
measures (extended even to food supplies) and the bombing of German 
 
 356.  The one mention in the Hague Regulations is the exception that proves the 
rule, stating, “civilians . . . entrusted with the delivery of despatches for their own army 
or for the enemy’s army” should not be “considered spies.” Hague Convention (IV) with 
Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 29 (1907). 
 357.  BEST, supra note 20, at 222. 
 358.  STEVENSON, supra note 250, at 201 (sketching differences with earlier blockade 
practice). 
 359.  OVERY, supra note 339, at 56–57. 
 360.  II CHARLES WEBSTER & NOBLE FRANKLAND, THE STRATEGIC AIR OFFENSIVE 
AGAINST GERMANY, 1939-1945, at 26 (1961) (“In the guerre de course [raiding at sea] 
cruisers . . . sought to evade the opposing naval forces and to strike direct blows at the 
commerce or military communications of the enemy.  In the night offensive, Bomber 
Command sought to evade the opposing fighters and to strike directly at German war 
industry and morale.”). 
 361.  For survey of Lauterpacht’s career and scholarly legacy, see OXFORD HANDBOOK, 
supra note 133, at 1179–83.  
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cities.362  He acknowledged that international law prohibited attacks aimed 
simply at killing non-combatants, but he insisted that weakening the 
enemy’s military resources was a legitimate aim, even though in a modern 
industrial economy, one could no longer distinguish “work which is and 
work which is not of direct military importance . . . .”363  Lauterpacht 
then invoked the historic debate:  Only the “continental writers,” he noted, 
had “regarded the distinction between combatants and civilians . . . as 
the most fundamental principle of the law of war,” seeing “war as a contest 
between state and state and between the armed forces of the belligerents.  
This view was not shared in the United States, in England or in some other 
countries.”364 Lauterpacht’s embrace of the traditional doctrine in this way 
did not disqualify him from subsequent appointment to the International 
Court of Justice, where he served from 1955 to 1960.365 
During the war, the loudest critics of Allied bombing were the Nazi 
leaders in Germany.366  Even at Nuremberg, a Luftwaffe commander 
insisted that Germany had only bombed Warsaw and Rotterdam to clear 
a path for the entry of German troops and had aimed only at immediate 
military objectives. Germany’s subsequent resort to bombing of English 
cities, he insisted, was mere retaliation for the bombing of Berlin in 1940.367  
It is undeniable that Britain had begun to build long-range bombers in 
the 1930s, while Germany never did so.368 Only two countries equipped 
 
 362.  Hersh Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, 29 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 360, 365–67 (1952). 
 363.  Id.  
 364.  Id. at 364. 
 365.  See OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 133. 
 366.  OVERY, supra note 339, at 275 (British bombing characterized by German 
propaganda as device of the “Jewish plutocratic enemy,” implementing “the Jews’ will 
to extermination” and “murder”); 310 (wartime German propaganda “always described 
Allied bombing as ‘terror bombing’). 
 367.  Testimony of Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, in 9 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR 
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 176–78, 214–19 (1947). 
 368.  German bombers could reach English cities by August of 1940 only because 
they were able to operate from airfields in northern France. British, and later, American 
bombers could range hundreds of miles from airfields in England to hit cities in southern 
and eastern Germany. A retired official of Britian’s Air Ministry published an analysis 
during the war, which gloated over Britain’s pre-war preparations for long-range bombing 
and Germany’s lack of preparation for it. See J.M. SPAIGHT, BOMBING VINDICATED 10 
(1944). He noted that the RAF sponsored development of long range bombers in the mid-
1930s,  id., and cited extensive German protests at bombing of civilians during the war 
as reflecting German incapacity to retaliate in kind. “Hitler. . . did not want mutual 
bombing to go on . . . He knew that, in the end, our air offensive, if it did not win the war 
for us, would certainly prevent Germany from wining it.” Id. at 12. 
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themselves with fleets of long-range bombers in the Second World War:  
Britain and the United States.369 
That too has some connection to the debates of earlier times. Surrounded 
by potential enemies, Germany in the 1930s built a force of fast-moving 
tank units for blitzkrieg (“lightening war”) just as it had planned for short 
decisive wars in 1914 and in 1870.370 When initial military campaigns in 
these wars did not prove immediately decisive, German commanders 
following German military doctrine responded with murderous brutality 
against civilian resistance. 
Meanwhile, Britain and America did what they could to encourage 
civilian resistance to German occupation, even armed resistance.371 They 
did so on the theory that such efforts might wear down the occupying 
forces in a long struggle—and were (as Victorian commentators in Britain 
had insisted) quite legitimate combat forces in a long war.372 
Britain and America, protected by the seas, had started the world wars 
with small armies, but uniquely powerful navies, so their military planners 
and strategists thought about ways to cripple the enemy in a long war.373 
 
 369.  OVERY, supra note 339, at 15–32 (preparation for long-range bombing in the 
1930s “essentially a British and American story”). 
 370.  CRAIG, supra note 308, at 205, 209, 278–83. 
 371.  Churchill organized the “Special Operations Executive” in July 1940, only a 
few weeks after the German conquest of France and the Low Countries. He seems to 
have been inspired by memories of how effective the Boer guerrillas had been in the 
South African war in 1901.  JOHN KEEGAN, WINSTON CHURCHILL 128 (Viking Penguin, 
2002).  For an overview of British efforts, DAVID STAFFORD, BRITAN AND EUROPEAN 
RESISTANCE, 1940-1945 (Univ. of Toronto Press 1980).  The British military officer who 
directed these operations through most of the war was initially chosen to organize secret 
British sabotage and guerrilla resistance efforts to counter the expected German invasion 
in the summer of 1940.  NICHOLAS RANKIN, CHURCHILL’S WIZARDS 386–91 (Faber & 
Faber 2008). 
 372.  On American support for resistance movements, organized by the Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS), founded in 1942, see R. HARRIS SMITH, THE SECRET HISTORY 
OF AMERICA’S FIRST CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Univ. of Cal. Press 1972). (OSS 
considered sponsoring Arab revolt against Vichy authorities in North Africa, but abandoned 
effort in deference to French concerns:  at 50; OSS support to resistance efforts within 
France extended to poorly disciplined Communist groups at 187–96). 
 373.  B. H. LIDDEL HART, THE BRITISH WAY IN WARFARE ADAPTABILITY AND 
MOBILITY (1942) (emphasizing naval support).  It is common to contrast the historic 
orientation of British military strategy—seeking to wear down the enemy with naval 
power and distant raids—with the head-on attacks, supposedly favored by American 
generals since Grant.  For a version of this contrast, see JOHN NAGL, LEARNING TO EAT 
SOUP WITH A KNIFE 35–51(Univ. of Chi. Press 2002).  But such comparisons abstract 
from the American preoccupation with naval strength, starting with Mahan’s highly 
influential The Influence of Sea Power Upon History. A.T. MAHAN, THE INFLUENCE OF 
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Strangling the Confederacy with a tightening blockade had been central 
to the Union’s strategy in the Civil War.374  It is hard to doubt that if 
squadrons of bombers had been available to General Sherman in 1864, 
he would have made full use of them. Neither Sherman nor his World 
War II successors, however, thought devastation of property was equivalent 
to mass murder of civilians.375 
Whatever later critics might say about Allied practices in the Second 
World War, the diplomats who negotiated the text of the United Nations 
Charter in 1945—representing some 60 countries—evinced no hesitation 
about such tactic. The Charter authorizes the Security Council to undertake 
“international enforcement action” by deploying “air force contingents” 
provided by “member states.” In 1945 that would have meant Britain and 
the United States.376  The Security Council was then authorized to order 
punitive bombing to enforce compliance with the Council directives.377 
The relevant Charter provision makes no mention of focusing such 
“enforcement action” exclusively on “military objects.” Nor does it say 
that collateral damage to “civilian objects” must never be “excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage” from particular 
airstrikes.378 
 
SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783 (1890).   The United States compelled Japan’s 
unconditional surrender in 1945 largely through air power and blockade and the seizure 
of strategic islands—without having landed a single American soldier on the Japanese 
home islands.   
 374.  CRAIG SYMONDS, THE CIVIL WAR AT SEA 32 (Praeger, 2009) (Lincoln’s 
blockade proclamation, five days after attack on Fort Sumter, was “virtually the first 
strategic decision of the war” and eventually engaged 500 ships and 100,000 men, “a 
total exceeding the number of ships and men committed in all of America’s previous wars 
combined). The blockade was more ambitious than “anything previously attempted” by naval 
powers, id. at 33, enforcing blockade given priority over protecting Union merchant ships 
from Confederate raiders, id. at 51–52,  blockade remained the “single greatest commitment” 
of the Union Navy and “absorbed huge resources [from the North] in both materiel and 
manpower.” Id. at 169–70. 
 375.  Commentators have long argued about whether Sherman should be credited as 
pioneering techniques of “total war” developed in 20th Century wars.  See discussion in 
GRIMLEY, HARD HAND, supra note 171, 215–18 (1997).  For defense of Sherman’s acceptance 
of underlying humanitarian limits, see BEST, supra note 20. 
 376.  U.N. Charter arts. 43 & 45. 
 377.  U.N. Charter art. 45. 
 378.  BRUNO SIMMA, ET AL., THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 766 (2d ed., 
Oxford Press 2002) (Commentary on Art. 45:  “The experience of the decisive role of 
[Anglo-American] air power in the Second World War led [framers of UN Charter] . . . 
to put this kind of military force at the service of the system of collective security that 
was being created” (emphasis added). The German scholars who prepared this treatise 
make no mention of limits on the Security Council’s use of “this kind of military force.”  
The requirement that damage to “civilian objects” must never be “excessive in relation to 
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” was introduced in AP-I, art. 
52.5(b) in 1977.).   
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The Charter also authorizes the Security Council to impose total blockade 
of delinquent states by sea, land, and air.379 It makes no exception for 
“civilian” goods, not even for  food. When the Council was finally able to 
find agreement to impose “economic sanctions” in a serious way, it did 
not go that far, but it did impose severe hardship on targeted states, with 
civilians experiencing the most severe suffering.380 
In the meantime, major powers developed arsenals of nuclear weapons, 
then of long-range missiles to deliver them.381 Suggestions in the 1960s 
that nuclear strikes should aim solely at military objects were either derided 
or, in the case of British and French leaders, denounced as a dangerous 
threat to deterrence.382 
From the perspective of actual history, it is AP I’s “Basic Rule” that 
seems a break with the past.  The Red Cross Commentary implies that 
AP I sought to restore the rules prevailing before the world wars.383  
Given actual disputes in earlier times—and the resoluteness with which 
earlier Anglo-American doctrines were actually applied in the world wars— 
it is more reasonable to see AP I as the product of new circumstances in 
the 1970s. These circumstances include the isolation and confusion of 
American diplomacy in the wake of defeat in Vietnam, the changed 
diplomatic balance in international forums with the advent of so many 
 
 379.  Article 42 of the Charter of the United Nations authorizes the Security Council to 
direct member states to impose “blockade . . . by air, sea, or land forces” of any state 
posing a “threat to the peace” or judged to have committed a “breach of the peace, or act 
of aggression,” pursuant to Article 39. While Article 41 contemplates “complete or 
partial interruption of economic relations” as “measures not involving the use of armed 
force,” if these “measures . . . have proved to be inadequate,” Article 42 authorizes the 
Council to direct “action [including] demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by 
air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.” 
 380.  See DAVID CORTRIGHT & GEORGE LOPEZ, THE SANCTIONS DECADE: ASSESSING UN 
STRATEGIES IN THE 1990S, at 47 (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2000). Economic sanctions on 
Iraq in 1990s estimated to have caused one third increase in infant mortality and tens of 
thousands of deaths among Iraqi children, id. at 46, and economic sanctions on Serbia 
resulted in fifty percent decline in “real income” under which “vast majority of the 
population suffered.” Id. at 73. 
 381.  David Rosenberg, Nuclear War Planning, in THE LAWS OF WAR (Michael 
Howard, ed., Yale Press 1994) (surveys arguments for the legality of the new weapons).  
 382.  Desmond Ball, The Development of the SIOP, 1960–1983, in STRATEGIC NUCLEAR 
TARGETING 67–68 (Desmond Ball & Jeffrey Richelson eds., Cornell Univ. Press 1986) 
(1962 proposal by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to clarify that U.S. nuclear 
strikes would target Soviet forces, not cities, met by “incredulous” response from Western 
Europe’s leaders, fearing it would remove deterrent effect, especially from small nuclear 
arsenals). 
 383.  COMMENTARY, supra note 12, at 598. 
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new nations in the wake of de-colonization, a general surge of utopian 
expectations connected with seeming shifts in the global balance of 
forces.384  At the same time diplomats in Geneva were negotiating the terms 
of Additional Protocol I, diplomats at UN headquarters in New York 
were passing resolutions calling for a “New World Economic Order,” 
featuring international commodity cartels to redistribute wealth from 
affluent western states to “less developed nations.”385 
The “Basic Rule” in AP I did not emerge out of thin air in the 1970s. 
It did have a prior history, but in visions advanced by European jurists 
before the First World War, which did not secure recognition in 
international conventions before AP-I. Perhaps we should take more 
seriously the claim advanced by European jurists in the Nineteenth 
Century and readily accepted their British critics at the time that the doctrine 
owes its origins to the radical impulses of the French Revolution or at 
least, to the teaching of the Revolution’s favorite philosopher, Jean-
Jacques Rousseau.386 
That has remained the view of leading commentators on the law of 
armed conflict even in more recent times. In 1985, Jean Pictet, a leading 
contributor to the Red Cross Commentary on AP I and the main editor of 
the ICRC’s earlier commentary on the 1949 conventions, published a 
short book, Development and Principles of International Humanitarian 
Law.387  It singles out one philosopher:  “Rousseau . . . gained the signal 
honour of having stated, clearly and for all time, the fundamental rule of 
the modern law of war.”388 Pictet followed up this volume with a massive 
work celebrating the historical struggles of American Indian tribes. As 
 
 384.  For analysis of the changed political context in the 1970s, see GEOFFREY BEST, 
WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945, at 323–35 (Oxford Univ. Press 1994). 
 385.  See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 
G.A. Res. S-6/3201, U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-6/3201 (May 1, 1974).  The project was inspired by 
the recent success of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting States (OPEC) in forcing 
dramatic increases in oil prices. The framers of NIEO viewed the success as a precedent 
to apply to other raw materials exported from less developed countries on the theory that 
western nations were so dependent on such materials, they would agree to pay greatly 
increased prices in return for stability of supply assured by UN-sponsored producer 
cartels.  Nothing of the kind was ever implemented.  For survey of economists’ reactions 
at the time, see JAGDISH BHAGWATIC, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: THE 
NORTH—SOUTH DEBATE XX (1977). 
 386.  SIMON SCHAMA, CITIZENS, A CHRONICLE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 378 (Knopf, 
1989) (documenting extensive appeals to Rousseau and Rousseauan doctrine among 
revolutionaries).  For Rousseau’s influence on Robespierre in particular see pages 577, 
579, 580, 584.  On the eve of the storming of the Bastille in 1789, the most popular exhibit in 
Paris included a display of J-J Rousseau in waxwork. Id. at 378. 
 387.  See generally PICTET, supra note 140. 
 388.  Id. at 23. 
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Pictet implicitly acknowledges, L’Epopee des Peaux Rouges (“Epoch of 
the Red Skins”) has a highly “Rousseauan” flavor.389 
Rousseau’s actual “statement” on the “fundamental rule” of war was 
so brief, so seemingly off-hand, that it might have been readily overlooked. 
Rousseau’s claim that war is solely a relation between states appears in 
The Social Contract, not in a chapter on war, but on “slavery.” The 
passage argues that victory in war does not give the victors the moral 
right to enslave the defeated.390 Rousseau says nothing at all about rules 
for waging war when the enemy is still resisting.391 
In regard to slavery, however, the English philosopher John Locke had 
made a similar argument nearly a century earlier in his Second Treatise 
of Government, of which Rousseau was quite aware.392 Rousseau’s 
 
 389.  JEAN PICTET, L’EPOPÉE DES PEAUX-ROUGES [THE EPIC OF THE RED SKINS] 
(1988). (Fr) Pictet cautions, at the outset, against authors who embrace “the romantic 
conception of the ‘noble savage,’ dear to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, authors who, in 
displaying their sympathy for the Red Skins, lose all impartiality.” Id. at 20. Pictet’s 
account puts him squarely in that category. Id. “On the moral plane, we recognize the 
force of soul of the North American Indian, the self-mastery and courage that is the 
characteristic of all free peoples . . . . He despises material goods, the artificial civilization 
which others attempted to impose on him along with the empty agitation of the modern 
world.” Id. at 16. “Almost all treaties were violated by the Whites,” he says, while “the 
Indians, themselves, never violated a single treaty.” Id. at 31. The Indians were, he 
concludes, “Heroes of a new Iliad, their memory will be perpetuated from generation to 
generation, until there are again, under the sun, men committed to the ideal, to courage 
and to liberty and we will again have the right to dream.” Id. at 777.  In this account, 
Anglo-Americans are mostly characterized by greed and violence and racist intolerance.  
Perhaps the moral of the book is that fighting nobly is more important than winning. Id.  
But it offers almost no details on how Indians actually did fight, though an alert reader 
might infer (as from occasional glancing references to “scalping”) that they did not 
always follow Geneva rules. Id. 
 390.  The Social Contract, supra note 82, at 15–16. 
 391.  The Social Contract offers no separate chapter “On War.” Actual war with 
other states remains largely out of view in this work. From what he does say in The 
Social Contract, it is highly unclear that Rousseau would have condemned seizures of 
enemy property. Rousseau insists that under a true or just social contract, individuals 
would first submit all their rights (evidently including property interests) to the community 
and acquire them back only on terms approved by the general will. Id. Private property 
in enemy territory might thus be understood as, in some sense, the ultimate property of 
the enemy state. Id. As a French scholar observes, “the very notion that war is a relation 
between states, not individuals, loses its power when individuals identify themselves 
with the state via the general will and patriotism.” Pierre Hasner, Rousseau and the 
Theory and Practice of International Relations, in THE LEGACY OF ROUSSEAU 207 (Clifford 
Orwin & Nathan Tarcov eds., 1997). 
 392.  As no one is free to take his own life, no one can “give another power over it,” 
so “slavery” is “but the State of War continued, between a lawful conqueror and a 
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contemporary, Emer de Vattel, had offered similar admonitions against 
enslaving the defeated in his Law of Nations—a work with which 
Rousseau was also quite familiar.393 
What the passage in the Social Contract added—and what seems to 
have attracted European commentators in later times—was the mystique 
of “the state.” The term does not appear at all in Locke’s treatise, which 
speaks rather of “the society” or “the people” or “the commonwealth.”394 
Vattel speaks most often of “the nation” or of “the sovereign,” meaning 
the person of the monarch.395  It was Rousseau who launched the notion 
of “the state” as a metaphysical entity, so that, as a component of “the 
state,” each man’s “feelings [are] ennobled, his entire soul soars so high,” he 
achieves “moral liberty, which alone makes man truly master of himself . . . 
[as] obedience to the law you have set yourself is [true] liberty.”396 
This doctrine was so abstract—so entangled in mystery—it could 
appeal in later generations to socialists as to romantic nationalists.  
Rousseau’s vision seemed to break with earlier natural law doctrines, 
which emphasized enduring obligations arising from human nature or 
from inherent limitations of the human condition.397  Rousseau’s doctrine 
opened the way to the very modern view that the only true law is the law 
 
captive”—exactly Rousseau’s claim in The Social Contract. John Locke, The Second 
Treatise, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, §§ 23–24,  284  (Peter Laslet ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1988). In his Discourse on Inequality, Rousseau, himself, cites Locke’s 
argument regarding slavery, with explicit and respectful attribution to Locke.  JEAN 
JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE FIRST AND SECOND DISCOURSES 167 (Roger Masters, trans., St. 
Martin’s Press 1962). 
 393.  VATTEL, supra note 111, at 284 (prisoners of war may not be put to death). Id. 
at 286 (“On no occasion when I may not justifiably put my prisoner to death [because he 
is “personally guilty of some crime deserving death”] may I make of him a slave.”). The 
Social Contract seems to have originated in a plea from Rousseau’s publisher to provide 
a counter to Vattel’s treatise. Since The Social Contract forgoes any actual discussion of 
diplomacy and war, Rousseau seems to have been most concerned to challenge the natural 
law grounding of Vattel’s treatise rather than any particular doctrines regarding international 
law.  See Albert de Lapradelle, Introduction, in VATTEL, supra note 111, at xxi. 
 394.  So, Ch. VII, distinguishing political from paternal authority, is entitled, “Of 
Political or Civil Society”—not “the State.”  Ch. VIII:  “Of the Beginning of Political 
Societies”; Ch. IX:  “Of the Ends of Political Society and Government”; Ch. X:  “Of the 
Forms of a Commonwealth”; “Ch. XII:  Of the Legislative, Executive and Federative 
Power of the Commonwealth” etc.  
 395.  The chapter titles offer a fair survey of Vattel’s usage: “Objects of Good 
Government” (I, vi); “Second Object of Good Government” (I, xi); “Common Duties of 
Nations” (Bk II, ch. i); “Mutual Commerce Between Nations” (II, ii); “Dignity and 
Equality of Nations” (II, iii); “Justice Between Nations” (II, v); “Passage of Troops 
Through a Neutral Country” (III, vii).  The Fenwick translations here faithfully reflect the 
terms in the original French text.  
 396.  The Social Contract, supra note 82, at 23–24.  
 397.  Id. at 32 (“The general will is always rightful and always tends to public utility”). 
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men give to themselves.398 The formalistic character of the doctrine does 
little to limit its content or application. 
In the hands of later German theorists, the premise that war is solely 
between states led to the conclusion that civilian resistance was a 
monstrous deviation from proper norms, which could, accordingly, be 
repressed with limitless brutality. Among many German thinkers, the 
premise that war is solely between states seems to have encouraged (or 
reinforced) the view that the claims of “the state” are on a far higher, nobler 
level then the security concerns of ordinary citizens, so war can be 
conceived as a contest of world views, where all means of force are 
permissible.399 
Given this history, we should be more open to claims that the traditional 
view was, in important ways, actually more humane. To say that war is a 
conflict between entire political communities does not deny that members 
of each community remain human beings. In debates before the First World 
War, British and American commentators defended seizure of sea-borne 
commerce on the grounds that enemy nationals were enemies, while 
simultaneously insisting that seizure of sea-borne property was a more 
humane tactic than those associated with massive land battles.400  These 
commentators took for granted that an “enemy” still had some claim to 
regard as a fellow human being.  As the Lieber Code put it, “Men who 
take up arms against one another do not cease on this account to be 
moral beings, responsible to one another and to God.”401  
Earlier writers embraced the same paradox—if it is actually a paradox:  
in war, enemies may forfeit many rights, especially rights of property, 
without thereby forfeiting all claims to concern for the protection of their 
lives and limbs, as human beings. John Locke actually gave much more 
attention than Rousseau to the clams of defeated nations in war, even in 
a “just war” against “aggressors.”  Locke insisted that it was wrong to 
starve defeated enemies and wrong to take land from their descendants.402  
Vattel’s treatise elaborated similar humanitarian restraints at greater 
 
 398.  LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 286 (UNIV. OF CHI. PRESS  1953) 
(summarizing the tendency of the argument, as “the general will takes the place of the 
natural law”). 
 399.  See supra notes 334, 335, infra note 405 and accompanying text. 
 400.  See supra notes 123–28. 
 401.  LIEBER CODE, supra note 161, art. 15. 
 402.  Locke, supra note 392, at 365–70. 
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length.403  These writers characterized war as a contest between entire 
political communities, but depicted political community as a means to 
secure the rights of its members.404 Wars viewed in these terms might be 
easier to limit than wars fought for “the state,” a mystical entity quite 
removed from the individual human beings in whose name it claims to 
act.405 
The traditional view disfavored acts of vengeance and triumphalism. 
Hence, the admonitions in the Lieber Code and the Hague convention 
against “pillage” of conquered towns and cities.406 In practice, the view 
that war is between whole communities encouraged the notion of imposing 
economic “costs” on the opposing community in war, treating the enemy 
as human actors capable of calculating their own interests rather than as 
robotic agents of their “state” or as irrelevant bystanders.  Imposing “costs” 
could involve much hardship for civilians, but it seems in a different category 
from the brutal “terror” tactics embraced by German legal advisors and 
actual field commanders in both world wars. 
Still, the contrast runs in both directions. The Rousseauan premise that 
war concerns only the state and its agents is so abstract that it can be 
invoked to support ferocious brutality, but may equally well encourage 
sentimental illusions. The Rousseauan doctrine that through the general 
will embodied in the state, man is free to give himself any law he chooses, 
may elevate “the state” above any larger, moral framework, but it then 
 
 403.  See VATTEL, supra at note 111, at 282–83, for discussions of the obligations to 
protect women, children, the aged, and the sick, immunities for ecclesiastics, men of 
letters and others, and protections for peasants and other unarmed people.  
 404.  Locke traces the “power of war and peace, leagues and alliances” in the 
commonwealth to “the power every man naturally had before he entered into Society.” 
Id. at 65.  In that “state of nature,” Locke says each man “is bound to preserve himself” 
and authorized by the “law of nature” only to use force against an aggressor that is 
“proportionate to his transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and 
restraint.” Id. at 271–72.  Vattel starts from Locke’s premise:  “Since nations are composed of 
men who are by nature free and independent and who before the establishment of civil 
society lived together in the state of nature, such nations or sovereign states must be 
regarded as so many free persons living together in the state of nature.” Id. at 3.Vattel 
then draws this conclusion:  “The right to use force, or to make war, is given to Nations 
only for their defense and for the maintenance of their rights.” Id. at 243.   
 405.  For an account of Nineteenth Century German thought, emphasizing its exaltation 
of the state—and an extreme moralism regarding the aims of the state—see JOHN DEWEY, 
GERMAN PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS 96 (Van Rees, 1942) (“the State, if not avowedly 
something mystic and transcendental, is at least a moral entity, the creation of self-
conscious reason operating in behalf of the spiritual and ideal interests of its members . . . . its 
purpose is the furthering of an ideal community.  The same thing is to be said of wars 
when they are really national wars.”).  
 406.  LIEBER CODE, supra note 161, art. 44 (“all pillage or sacking, even after taking 
a place by main force . . . are prohibited”).  Hague Convention IV, supra note 19, art. 28 
(“pillage of a town or place, even when taken by assault, is prohibited.”).  
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remains quite open-ended.407  The least one can say is that the Rousseauan 
outlook abstracts from much sad, but persistent, reality. It abstracts, one 
might say, from the natural “course of human events.” 
First, the doctrine of war as solely a relation between states hides from 
view the inescapable fact that behind “the state” are human beings, who 
make particular choices in particular circumstances.  It therefore encourages 
the very pleasing view that outcomes in war can be determined entirely 
on battlefields, on the seemingly logical view that the armed forces are 
the sole instrument of “the state” in war. 
It was an attractive view in the late Nineteenth Century because it did 
seem to accord with recent experience of war in Central Europe. In the 
war provoked by Bismarck’s diplomatic maneuverings in 1866, the army 
of the Prussian monarch fought one decisive battle against the army of 
the Austrian emperor—out in the countryside, away from population 
centers.  The court in Vienna then drew the logical conclusion and quickly 
agreed on necessary concessions to satisfy King Wilhelm of Prussia. It 
was known at the time as the Seven Weeks War.408 The issues in dispute 
were so soon forgotten that Austria and Prussia could negotiate a long-
lasting alliance only a few years later.409 
Not all wars were like that, however, even in the Nineteenth Century.  
Long wars can engage whole populations, as was true of the American 
Civil War and many episodes of the wars against Napoleon. In any 
longer war, civilians pay the costs one way or another, civilians provide 
the military’s equipment and supplies, civilians support (or at least obey, 
thereby enabling) the government that directs the war.  All this is obscured 
by insisting that war is simply a contest of “states.”  These facts remain 
the focus in the Anglo-American view that war is not about defeating 
 
 407.  On ambiguities of Rousseau’s general stance toward war, see THOMAS PANGLE & 
PETER J. AHRENSDORF, JUSTICE AMONG NATIONS, 185–90 (1999).  On varied responses 
to Rousseau among subsequent German thinkers, RICHARD VELKELY, BEING AFTER 
ROUSSEAU, PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURE IN QUESTION (Univ. of Chicago Press 2002) (tracing 
influence of Rousseau's attack on 'nature' through succession of German thinkers, 
culminating in Martin Heidegger, philosophic advocate for National Socialism). 
 408.  See GORDON CRAIG, GERMANY 1866-1945, at 3–7 (Oxford Univ. Press 1978) 
(on Bismarck’s successful efforts to settle the war by negotiation after the first decisive 
battle, rather than let the Prussian army march on Vienna and conquer the Austrian capital, as 
some in Prussian government preferred). 
 409.  Id. at 114 (on 1879 alliance with Austria as “a landmark in European history” 
because the first not to be concluded in the midst of war or on the eve of anticipated 
war). 
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armies, but about imposing terms—which means coercing the enemy’s 
will, not only the enemy’s forces. 
A second, related problem with the Rousseauan view of war (or what 
we might now call, the Red Cross view) is that it abstracts entirely from 
the nature of the opposing power. Tactics that would be improper in a 
limited contest with a cautious and restrained opponent might be morally 
permissible in a long war against a peculiarly brutal opponent.  All 
previous conventions on humanitarian restraint in war made restraining 
rules conditional on the enemy’s acceptance of them410 and violations of 
the rules punishable by reprisal in kind.411 AP I goes far beyond any 
previous convention by insisting that its restrictions must be honored in 
all international conflicts, regardless of whether they are actually honored 
by the opposing side.412 
The AP-I approach may reflect the Rousseauan view that man is free 
to give rules to himself, providing only that they have the form of 
generality.  But what if, by faithfully observing all rules even against an 
enemy that observes none of them, a nation condemns itself to ultimate 
defeat?  In Rousseau’s theory (or that of his disciple, Immanuel Kant), 
 
 410.  The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions on the Law and Custom of War on 
Land stipulate (in art. 2 of both versions) that the accompanying Regulations “do not 
apply except between contracting Powers and then only if all the belligerents are parties 
to the Convention.” See Hague Convention II, supra note 18; see also Hague Convention 
IV, supra note 19. Each of the 1949 Geneva Convention applies more broadly to “armed 
conflict . . . between two or more of the High Contracting Parties,” or signatories. In 
conflicts involving some non-signatories, however, “the Powers who are parties [to the 
particular convention] shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations” and only to a 
non-signatory “if the latter accepts and applies the provision thereof” (emphasis added). 
See Geneva Convention (I) supra note 21, art. 2; Geneva Convention (II), supra note 22, 
at art. 2; Geneva Convention (III), supra note 23, art. 2; Geneva Convention (IV), supra 
note 24, at art. 2. Additional Protocol I applies to the “situations referred to” in Article 2 
of the 1949 conventions and extends this coverage to “conflicts in which peoples are 
fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes”—
without any requirement that any such “people” actually “accepts and applies provisions” of 
the 1949 conventions or Protocol I in their own conduct. See Protocol I, supra note 2, at 
art. 1.  
 411.  Should a state “contract” to honor the Hague Regulations, but then violate 
them in practice, the victim of such delinquencies remained free (under prevailing 
doctrine, not challenged in the Regulations) to retaliate in kind—that is, to act against the 
violator in the same way. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 133, at 248 (“reprisals between 
belligerents are admissible for any and every act of illegitimate warfare”). 
 412.  The 1949 conventions do prohibit reprisals on protected categories: wounded 
soldiers and hospitals, shipwrecked sailors and hospital ships, prisoners of war, civilians 
in occupied territory.  But Protocol I includes sweeping prohibitions on reprisals, barring 
even reprisals against “civilian objects.” Protocol I, supra note 2, at art. 52, ¶ 1(“Civilian 
objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals”).  If you cannot even destroy the 
enemy’s property to penalize violations—such as the murder of war prisoners by the 
enemy—there is no feasible reprisal.   
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such consequences may be dismissed as morally irrelevant, as only the 
embrace of universal rules establishes man’s moral freedom.413  Yet 
most people have somewhat different moral intuitions.  As recently as 
the 1990s, the ICJ could not find a majority for the view that using or 
threatening to use nuclear weapons was always wrong; half the judges 
refused to condemn resort to nuclear weapons in a conflict threatening 
national existence.414 What sort of foe would seek to extinguish the 
competing nation altogether? A common approach to all wars between 
all “states” is more plausible if one keeps to abstractions without considering 
what a particular “state” may be prepared to do in a particular conflict. 
And what about combatants who do not belong to a state?  AP I insists 
on prisoner of war protections for guerilla fighters, even if not connected 
by ties of loyalty to an established government.415 In effect, AP I moves 
from the idea that war is a contest between states to the view that, when 
there is no state, war is simply a contest between combatants. Red Cross 
commentators thus insist that humanitarian law knows only two categories:  
combatants, eligible for Geneva protections for war prisoners or “civilians,” 
protected by international human rights standards, applicable in peacetime.416 
It may be reasonable in many circumstances to grant the full range of 
POW protections to guerrilla fighters; it is far less reasonable to extend 
such protections to participants in terror networks.417 It may also be 
 
 413.  On connections between Rousseau’s general will and  Kant’s categorical 
imperative and subsequent course of German idealist thought, see DAVID JAMES, ROUSSEAU 
AND GERMAN IDEALISM (Cambridge Univ. Press 2013).  On Kant’s prescriptions for 
cosmopolitan law of peace and its dependence “metaphysical postulate” of human freedom, 
Amanda Perreau-Saussine, “Immanuel Kant and International Law,” in THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas, eds., Oxford Univ. Press 
2010).  
 414.  The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
I.C.J., July 8, 1996. 
 415.  Article 43 demands prisoner of war protections for “members of the armed 
forces of a Party to a conflict.” Article 44 then calls for “protections equivalent in all 
respects” even for “combatants” who meet none of the requirements imposed in the 1949 
Geneva Convention No. III Article 4 on Prisoners of War and do not necessarily belong 
to a state.  
 416.  Louise Doswald-Beck & Sylvain Vite, Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 
Law, 293 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 94 (1993). 
 417.  In the Vietnam conflict, the United Stated treated Viet Cong captives according to 
Geneva rules for prisoner of wars. However, the United States was not willing to apply 
the same rules for detainees at Guantanamo, partly because the rules make isolation of 
prisoners from each other from interrogation purposes or to offer inducements to provide 
difficult information.  Securing information was a high priority.   
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straining military necessities to insist that civilians should incur no costs 
for aiding and shielding guerrillas. 
There are, of course, serious moral challenges in formulating acceptable 
tactics against guerrilla insurgencies—as against any enemy.  The approach 
in AP I is not obviously the best guide to such challenges. It does not 
focus on the clearest moral priority for humanitarian law—the protection 
of human life. AP I gives so much emphasis to the distinction between 
“civilian” and “military, “that the distinction between threats to life and 
harm to property fades from view.  Instead of emphasizing that unarmed 
people should not be objects of lethal attack—embracing the surrendered 
combatant with the civilian—AP I insists on the orthogonal “basic rule,” 
that civilians and “civilian objects” (i.e., property) must be excluded 
from attack. 
It may seem ironic that the longest and most detailed convention on 
“humanitarian” law is blind to the moral priority of human life over mere 
“objects.”  But it is also, in a way, logical.  AP-I starts by abstracting from 
who is fighting whom, how they are fighting, and why, in ways that make 
actual human beings on each side irrelevant.  All natural law theorists before 
Rousseau asserted that human beings cannot live decently (or safely) 
outside political communities, so membership in a political community 
is a very basic element of the human condition.418 Political communities 
differ, which is one reason there is often conflict among them. A doctrine of 
war that abstracts from such primal facts is not likely to be a reliable 
guide—or even a humane guide—to the moral conduct of military action. 
Whatever one might say about theoretical premises, two aspects of 
contemporary affairs assure continued relevance to the historic debate 
about war. One was foreshadowed in the warning offered by a British 
delegate at the Geneva conference that drafted AP I:  “If standards [are] 
pitched too high, they might be regarded as unattainable and consequently 
ignored.”419  Britain waited more than two decades to ratify AP I and 
then did so only with numerous reservations, as other English speaking 
countries did.420  The United States has never ratified AP I. 
 
 418.  HEINRICH ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW 62–82 (Liberty Fund, 1998, reprinting 
1947 translation of German original) (contrasting early modern natural law theorists with 
Rousseau). 
 419.  OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFRIMATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (1978), Vol. V, p. 133, par. 
34 Plenary Session of March 6, 1974 (statement of Sir Colin Crowe). On Bush administration 
reasons for excluding the full range of Geneva protections from Guantanamo detainees, 
see YOO, supra note 7, at 128–64. 
 420.  Among other things, these reservations reserved the right to make reprisals in 
kind for attacks against civilians and civilian objects even though Protocol I purports to 
prohibit such reprisals. See Protocol I, supra note 2, at art. 52. The Manual of the Law of 
Armed Conflict, prepared by the UK Ministry of Defense, acknowledges that an 
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Official U.S. military doctrine is, in fact, hard to reconcile with the 
strictures of AP I. The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval 
Operations authorizes—as in the world wars—complete interception of 
ocean-borne commerce with an enemy state in time of war.421  When it 
comes to bombardment, the manual defines permissible targets to include 
“objects which . . . effectively contribute to the enemy’s war-fighting or 
war-sustaining capability and whose total or partial destruction would 
constitute a definite military advantage to the attacker at the time of the 
attack.”422  It goes on to explain that, “Economic targets of the enemy 
that indirectly but effectively support and sustain the enemy’s war-fighting 
capability may also be attacked.”423 Some European critics warned that 
by such loose formulas (“war sustaining”), almost any target could be 
justified.424  If the international standard requires that only “military objects” 
can be attacked, “military objects” will be defined very broadly. 
Meanwhile, a second development gives renewed relevance to the old 
debate.  Advances in technology have enabled attacks to be conducted 
with remarkable precision, whether through drones and bombs guided by 
electronic navigation systems, or by cyber-attacks targeted on specific 
computer networks. It is much more realistic now to target “civilian 
objects” with the expectation that we will cause no immediate harm to 
human bodies.425  As it is, we impose economic sanctions to coerce states. 
 
international tribunal has held that “attacks on civilians by way of reprisal can never be 
justified,” but insists “the court’s reasoning is unconvincing and the assertion that there 
is a prohibition [against reprisals] in customary law flies in the face of most of the state 
practice that exists [i.e., precedents from the actual conduct of states in war]. The UK 
does not accept the position as stated in this judgment.”  MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT 425, n.62 (Oxford Univ. Press 2004).  
 421.  The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations NWP 9, in 64 
INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES: THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 470 app. (Horace Robertson 
ed., 1991) [hereinafter The Commander’s Handbook].  
 422.  Id.  at 474 
 423.  Id. at 475. (emphasis added) 
 424.  See, e.g., Frits Kalshoven, Noncombatant Persons: A Comment to Chapter II 
of the Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, in The Commander’s 
Handbook, supra note 421, at 310 (“to add ‘war-sustaining effort’ is going too far, however, 
as this might easily be interpreted to encompass virtually every activity in the enemy 
country.”). 
 425.  For elaboration on the potential of cyber-attacks, see Jeremy Rabkin and Ariel 
Rabkin, Navigating Conflicts in Cyberspace:  Legal Lessons from the History of War at 
Sea, 14 CHICAGO J. INT’L L. 197 (2013).  For a broader version of the argument, see Jeremy 
Rabkin & John Yoo, A Return to Coercion:  International Law and New Weapons 
Technologies, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1187 (2014). 
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In recent years, for example, western states have imposed severe economic 
sanctions against Iran, in an effort to compel Iranian leaders to  abandon 
their nuclear weapons program.  Harm to the civilian economy is not a 
byproduct, but the purpose of such sanctions.426  One may say economic 
sanctions are not subject to rules about armed conflict since they do not 
involve “armed force,” but it is hard to see why harms that may be imposed 
indirectly through sanctions must be regarded as humanitarian violations 
when imposed directly through “force.” 
To hold to a strict view of “distinction” in all circumstances—as AP I 
and ICRC commentators demand—is to hold to the Rousseauan fallacy 
that human beings can give themselves a law at odds with naturally 
occurring challenges, at odds even with reasonable views of natural limits 
on permissible action in war. The doctrine of AP I does not become more 
convincing by attributing it to all or most “states”—as if words on paper 
could establish a supreme moral authority, even when most states do not 
act in accordance with those words and others have no occasion to show 
whether they would respect them in practice.427  It is no more convincing 
to rewrite history, as the Red Cross Commentary does, to make it seem 
as if the new rules have always been the rules. 
At the least, we should remember the greatest natural law document of 
the Eighteenth Century, which cautioned that the human right to choose 




 426.  Economists assessing western sanctions on Iran (to force it to comply with 
international non-proliferation obligations) found that Iranian oil revenues dropped by 
50% between 2011 and 2012, triggering a 50% drop in the value of the Iranian currency, 
a 20% jump in unemployment and food riots in various cities.  Steven Blockmans & 
Stefan Waizer, E3+3 coercive diplomacy towards Iran, CEPS Policy Brief (June 6, 
2013), available at www.ceps.eu.  
 427.  The Red Cross insists that almost all provisions of AP-I have now become 
customary law, binding even on states that have not ratified the convention or ratified it 
with reservations against particular provisions.  But the claim is based on a compilation 
of what states have said, rather than what they do. See CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 3; Bellinger & Haynes, supra note 4.  
 428.  “Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not 
be changed for light and transient causes . . . .”  American Declaration of Independence, 
July 4, 1776. The authors of the Declaration actually took considerable pains to make it 
conform—or at least, seem to conform—to what they understood as the prevailing law of 
nations in 1776, thereby practicing what they preached, even at the outset of a revolution.  
DAVID ARMITAGE, FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL THOUGHT 198–202 (Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2013). 
